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INSTINCT AND REASON 



THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OE 
HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 



By SIR GEORGE RAMSAY, Bart., 

Acthob of " An Essay on the Distribution op Wealth,' 

" Principles of Psychology," 

"A Classification of the Sciences," etc. 



LONDON : 



WALTON AND MABERLY, UPPER GOWER STREET, 
AND IVY LANE, PATERNOSTER ROW. 

MDCCCLXII. 



CONTENTS. 



PAET FIRST. 

INSTINCT. 
CHAPTER I. 

Page. 
Of Knowledge in general, 1 

CHAPTER n. 

Of different kinds of Knowledge, 7 

CHAPTER HI. 
Of Instinctive Knowledge, . * 9 

Section First. 
Of Instinctive Knowledge in general, 9 

Section Second. 
Of Personal Identity and of Memory, 12 

Section Third. 
Knowledge of Matter, 18 

Section Fourth. 
Knowledge of Uniformity in Nature, 24 

Section Fifth. 
Knowledge of our own Free Will, 29 

Section Sixth. 
Belief in Human Testimony, 40 



VI CONTENTS. 

PAET SECOND. 

REASON. 

CHAPTER I. 
Of Rational Knowledge in general, 44 

CHAPTER II. 

Of Simple Intuitive Knowledge, 50 

CHAPTER III. 

Of Complex Intuitive Knowledge, 85 

Section First. 
Of Reasoning in general, . . . , 85 

Section Second. 
On different kinds of Reasoning, 93 

I. Of Reasoning a priori, 94 

II. Of Reasoning a posteriori, 110 

CHAPTER. IV. 

Of the Reason of Animals, 134 



INSTINCT. 



PART FIRST. 

INSTINCT. 
CHAPTER I. 

OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 

1. Locke has said, " Since the mind in all its thoughts 
and reasonings hath no other immediate object but its 
own Ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate ; it 
is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about 
them." i 

2. If this sentence be understood in its obvious mean- 
ing, it certainly gives a very inadequate view of human 
knowledge ; for it seems to embrace nothing but the 
knowledge of ideas, or the science of mind, 2 which, 
though the most important, is by no means the only de- 
partment of knowledge with which we are conversant. 

1 Essay concerning Human Understanding. Book IV. chap. 1. 

2 I here suppose that by Ideas Locke meant simply mental pheno- 
mena in general, not ideas in that peculiar sense, which has been attri- 
buted to him, (especially by Sir William Hamilton), as something 
immaterial, yet distinct from the mind, and existing even out of consci- 
ousness. That Locke did not hold that opinion, I have, I think, proved. 
See Principles of Psychology, supplement to chapter " Of Perception.*' 



2 INSTINCT. 

3. This much is certain, that nothing is immediately 
present to the mind but its own Feelings or its own 
Thoughts, 1 and consequently; that all our knowledge must 
be either of them or through them. How it comes to 
pass that by means of mental phenomena we become 
acquainted with things totally different, is, no doubt, a 
a great mystery ; but, unless we deny the existence of 
matter, the fact is indisputable. 

4. All our knowledge, then, is either immediate or 
mediate ; either the knowledge of our own feelings and 
thoughts, or of other things through the medium of 
these. The importance of Psychology is hence appar- 
ent ; for mental phenomena are not only interesting in 
themselves, but they are the channel of communication 
with every thing else. 

5. Since the knowledge of our own feelings and 
thoughts is alone immediate, we ought to be much better 
acquainted with them than with other things. And, no 
doubt, we are in one sense, though, possibly, not in an- 
other. "We know the particular feelings and thoughts 
perfectly, as they arise successively in our minds ; but we 
may be very ignorant of their composition, connection, 
and origin ; in other words, we know them practically, 
but not scientifically. Here, as elsewhere, it is true that 
what is nearest to us is often least comprehended as a 
whole. The very interest we take in the particulars, 
their engrossing nature, clouds our general view. More- 
over, it is difficult for the mind, even with intention, to 
turn round and examine its own phenomena ; and the 
very act of examination may modify them. Lastly, the 

1 See the Author's " Principles of Psychology." Part I., chap. 2. 



OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 3 

phenomena are fleeting, and liable to change, and there- 
fore cannot long be examined at one time. For these 
reasons, Psychology is one of the most difficult of 
sciences ; though, from our immediate knowledge of the 
subject thereof, it seems susceptible of a great advance 
towards perfection. 

6. From the above it follows that all men are more or 
less Psychologists ; they must know something of their 
own minds, their own feelings, and thoughts, they cannot 
prevent themselves from so knowing ; for those feelings 
and thoughts press upon them at every turn. Conse- 
quently, the opinions of untutored men in reference to 
Psychology are entitled to more respect then their 
opinions on any other subject. In Natural Philosophy, 
for instance, the views of untaught men are of no value 
whatever, they are often the very reverse of the truth ; for 
they judge mostly by appearances, and these are deceit- 
ful. Judging by appearances, men long thought that the 
earth was the centre of the universe, round which the 
sun, planets, and fixed stars performed a daily revolution. 
And how could they think otherwise? To assert the 
contrary must have seemed at first a violent paradox, 
in opposition, it might be said, to our very senses. Do we 
not see the sun rise and set as well as the stars ? It re- 
quired no little Philosophy to prove that* we see no such 
thing ; that we only see phenomena, changing phenomena, 
from which we infer motion of the sun and stars, while 
we ought to infer from the same phenomena motion of 
the earth. This one thing is certain, the phenomena ad- 
mit of two explanations ; and why should untaught men 
necessarily stumble upon the right ? The senses give us 



4 INSTINCT. 

directly no information with respect to external objects ; 
they furnish us only with sensations. Of these we can- 
not doubt, but our inferences therefrom may or may not 
be correct. It is not then our senses that deceive us, 
but the thoughts which we build thereupon. 

7. Another corollary from the above is, that startling 
paradoxical opinions on the subject of Psychology ought 
to be looked upon with peculiar suspicion ; as opposed 
to the common opinions of mankind on a matter strict- 
ly within their competence. Psychological paradoxes 
are prima facie self-condemned ; and though they may 
obtain a hearing, they must expect to be silenced at last 
by the indignant clamour of unlearned metaphysicians. 
Thus the daring opinions of an ingenious writer of the 
present day, confounding subject with object, self with 
non-self, mind with matter, are scouted universally, as 
opposed to our intimate conviction, which nothing can 
overthrow or even weaken, that the things thus confound- 
ed are really distinct. 

8. From what precedes it further appears that all our 
knowledge begins with that of Self, obtained through con- 
sciousness. This is the fons et origo of all our acquire- 
ments, how various soever they may be ; and this must 
exist with the knowledge of every thing which is not 
self, for through self alone can the non-self be reached. 
Moreover, though the information about other things 
obtained through consciousness may be very defective 
or utterly wrong ; yet the immediate knowledge which 
consciousness effects is free from all doubt. To doubt 
that we think is a contradiction, for the very doubt is 
itself a thought, and by the very nature of feeling, we 



OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 5 

must know whether we feel or not. It is satisfactory to 
be thus assured that the source and the condition of all 
our knowledge is itself free from cavil. 

9. Before preceeding further it may be well to inquire 
whether the word knowledge admit of any ambiguity, 
and consequently any explanation. By Locke the term 
knowledge is limited to certainty, and other knowledge 
commonly so called is designated probability. This it 
must be allowed is an unusual meaning of the word, 
unwarranted either by popular usage or by philosophical 
authority, which generally treats of knowledge as either 
certain or probable. By far the greater part of what we 
commonly call knowledge is of the latter sort. A man 
of great knowledge means one whose mind is stored with 
facts, most of which are not of undoubted certainty. At 
the same time, mere suggestion, mere supposition, are not 
called knowledge. Unless the probability be in favour 
of any fact, that term is never applied. When we say, 
I do not merely think so, / know it, we mean that we 
have, if not a certain, at least a very strong assurance of 
the truth of the fact, founded on evidence powerful if not 
demonstrative. Thus, unless we limit with Locke the 
meaning of the word to certainty, it is impossible to say 
where knowledge begins or ends ; because the degrees of 
probability are infinite ; and what seems probable to one, 
and is therefore esteemed knowledge, may seem impro- 
bable to another, and consequently no knowledge at all. 
Even Locke, who restricts knowledge to certainty, is 
somewhat doubtful whether sensitive knowledge, as he 
calls it, be properly entitled to the name, and he begs it 
to be admitted under the category, as if by courtesy. We 



6 INSTINCT. 

must not then attempt to fix the boundaries of knowledge 
very strictly ; just as we cannot always say whether a 
certain shade of colour be light or dark ; but we must 
bear in mind that by its very nature knowledge is some- 
what indefinite. Strong belief in any event past or pre- 
sent is often called knowledge, though the event may not 
be true. To knowledge of the future we more seldom 
pretend, because our belief is less firm ; though Job does 
say, "I know that my Kedeemer liveth, and that he shall 
stand at the latter day upon the earth/' 1 

1 Chap. xix. ver. 25. 



CHAPTER II. 



OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE. 

1. Haying ascertained the nature of Knowledge in 
general, as well as the case admits, for we have seen 
that it cannot be strictly defined ; and having seen not 
only that Knowledge begins with the feelings and 
thoughts of our minds, but that these, the latter at 
least, are an indispensable condition of all knowledge, 
at all times ; we have next to enquire whether there be 
not different kinds thereof. That there are different 
degrees we have already seen, varying from absolute 
certainty to a small excess of probability. Certainty 
admits not of degrees, but the degrees of probability are 
infinite. 

2. Knowledge may be divided into kinds in different 
ways, upon different principles. First, we may divide 
it, according to the evidence upon which it rests, into 
the certain and the probable, including under the latter 
a degree of probability which commonly passes for cer- 
tainty. That the sun will rise to-morrow we cannot 



8 INSTINCT. 

doubt; but according to this division it is an event 
highly probable only. We must allow it to be possible 
that the sun shall not rise again ; and therefore possibly 
not to-morrow. 

3. Again, knowledge may be divided into the original 
and the derivative, words which sufficiently explain 
themselves. If we possess any knowledge at all, some 
portion of it at least must be original, for whatever is 
derived, is derived from something, and that something, 
if not itself derived, must be original. If itself derived, 
it must proceed from something earlier, which is either 
original or built upon what was original. Therefore, 
that some portion of our knowledge is original, is a 
necessary consequence of the admission that we possess 
any knowledge at all. It is possible that all our know- 
ledge is original ; but impossible that all is derivative. 
To ascertain what knowledge is original and what not, 
may be a difficult task; but this difficulty does not 
effect the reality of this distinction. As there can be no 
reasoning without premises granted, so without primitive 
knowledge none could be acquired. 

4. Lastly, knowledge may be divided into the instinc- 
tive and the rational; according to the source whence it 
springs, from Instinct or from Keason. As this seems 
to be the distinction which cuts most deeply into the 
human mind, we shall adopt it as the ground of our 
future observations. 



CHAPTEK III. 

OF INSTINCTIVE KNOWLEDGE. 

SECTION FIKST. 
OF INSTINCTIVE KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 

1. Accurately to distinguish the boundaries of Instinct 
and Eeason is no easy task. Popular language, however, 
and popular opinion, acknowledge the distinction ; and 
these, as we have seen, are not to be despised in questions 
of mental philosophy. We cannot, indeed, expect any 
great accuracy in the notions and discourses of daily 
life ; but philosophy without precision is unworthy of 
the name. Let us then endeavour clearly to distinguish 
between instinct and reason. 

2. Eeason is commonly supposed to be that faculty 
whereby Man is especially distinguished from the lower 
animals, which are said to be mere creatures of Instinct. 
Whether this be or be not true, we shall see presently; but 
were it granted, it still would not tell us what reason and 
what instinct is, and how they differ. If man alone have 



10 INSTINCT. 

reason, he has instinct also ; so that instinct, at least, is 
common to him and the rest of the animal creation. 
Those who consider man as the only rational animal, at 
the same time allow that he is not all rational, that he 
has instinct also. This question, then, concerns man as 
well as the other families of animated nature. 

3. The word instinct is often applied to the emotions 
as well as to the intellectual part of our nature. All the 
primary desires are instincts, that is, they arise without 
any effort, whether we will or not, by the original con- 
stitution of our minds, without meditation, without any 
view to consequences, without any thought beyond that of 
the wished-for object. Such are desire of life, of power, 
of glory, of affection. Such desires may be encouraged 
or discouraged, they may grow into passions or decline 
into indolent longings ; but they must exist before they 
can be cultivated or depressed, before they can rise into 
dignity or sink into insignificance. They are a part of 
the original furniture of the mind, furniture that may 
or may not be polished and adorned, that may get very 
old, but which never can quite wear out. To these pri- 
mary desires the term instinct is constantly applied ; as 
when we talk of the instinct of self-preservation. 

4. This use of the word in the case of the emotions 
may help us to fix the sense of instinct when applied 
to the intellect. Instinctive knowledge, like an instinc- 
tive emotion, must, in the first place, be original, not 
derived from previous knowledge; it must be got without 
effort, whether we will or not ; without meditation ; 
without any wish for it ; it must rush into our minds, 
we know not how ; and must be held to, we cannot tell 



OF INSTINCTIVE KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 11 

why ; it must be firmly relied on, but not discerned to 
be true. Where all these characteristics meet, there is 
instinctive knowledge. 

5. The characteristics of instinctive knowledge may 
more methodically be summed up thus : — 

First, — It must be original, not derived from pre- 
vious knowledge. From this it follows, as a corollary, 
that it is got without effort, whether we will or not ; 
without seeking, without meditation ; that it neither de- 
mands nor admits of logical proof. 

Secondly, — It must be universal, held by all men with- 
out exception ; even by those who profess to doubt it. 

Thirdly, — It must be irresistible, proof against all 
sceptical arguments, though unanswerable. 

Fourthly, — It must not be self-evident, like the axi- 
oms of mathematics; in other words it must not be 
discerned to be true. The corollary from this is, that 
the denial of instinctive truth, however perverse, is still 
admissible ; for such denial is, strictly speaking, not 
absurd, that is, not directly opposed to reason. 

These four characteristics, with their corollaries, suffi- 
ciently determine what is instinctive knowledge. 



12 INSTINCT. 

SECTION SECOND. 
OF PERSONAL IDENTITY AND OF MEMORY. 

1. Let us now take specimens of such knowledge, and 
let us see how the above characteristics apply. 

2. All our knowledge begins with Consciousness, con- 
sciousness of some feeling or thought actually present ; 
and of which, therefore, as we have seen, we cannot 
doubt. This is the foundation of all knowledge, but 
taken alone, it is not knowledge ; for, had our mental 
life been merely a succession of feelings and thoughts 
without any conscious connection between them, we 
should have remained for ever ignorant of all things. 
Such a supposition is possible ; and it is enough to show 
that the knowledge of self is not necessarily involved in 
consciousness, that we might have had feelings and 
thoughts innumerable in constant succession, without 
any acquaintance with self. The supposition is ten- 
able because it is not inconsistent, one part does not 
contradict another ; and consequently the knowledge of 
our Identity is not self-evident or necessary. 

3. This, however, must be allowed, that knowledge, 
properly so called, does necessarily suppose some know- 
ledge of self; for, how could I be said to know any- 
thing beyond the feeling or thought of the present mo- 
ment, unless I myself were somehow known. This 
knowledge is clearly implied in every other. In this 
sense, and in this sense alone, we may admit the first 
proposition of an ingenious writer of the present day, as 



OF PERSONAL IDENTITY AND OF MEMORY. 13 

contained in bis " Theory of Knowing and Being," that 
" Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must, 
as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some 
cognisance of itself J 3 Yes, along with whatever any 
intelligence knows; but this does not prove that self- 
knowledge is a necessary article of belief, but only, like 
memory, necessary to all other knowledge. We might 
have had a succession of feelings and thoughts, without 
memory, without a knowledge of self ; but such a suc- 
cession would not be knowledge. 

4. The above Proposition, as thus understood, seems 
to be true, and consequently harmless at least, if not 
fruitful ; but Proposition Second, which the author de- 
duces from the First, is paradoxical in the extreme, 
being opposed to the universal intuitive reason of man- 
kind. This Proposition contains the whole of his sys- 
tem ; and if it be upset, the whole must fall. It is as 
follows : — " The object of all knowledge, whatever it may 
be, is always something more than what is naturally or 
usually regarded as the object. It always is, and must 
be, the object with the addition of oneself, — object plus 
subject — thing, or thought, mecum. Self is an integral 
and essential part of every object of cognition. 

" Demonstration. 

u It has been already established as the condition of all 
knowledge, that a thing can be known only provided the 
intelligence which apprehends It knows itself at the same 
time. But if a thing can be known only provided one- 
self be known along with it, it follows that the thing (or 
thought) and oneself together, must, in every case, be the 



14 INSTINCT. 

object, the true and complete object of knowledge, in 
other words, it follows that that which we know always 
is, and must be, object plus subject, object cum alio — 
thing or thought with an addition to it, — which addition 
is the me; Self, therefore, is an integral and essential 
part of every object of cognition." 1 

5. Now, let us observe, in the first instance, that the 
author allows in the enunciation of the Proposition that 
the object of knowledge, as understood by Mm, differs 
from what is naturally and usually regarded as the object, 
differs by containing something not commonly compre- 
hended under it. Why, then, it may be asked, do you 
call it an object ? why attach a new meaning to an old 
and well-understood word ? Your object, it is allowed, 
is not the object of other men. Accordingly, in the de- 
monstration we are told that " if a thing can be known 
only provided oneself be known along with it, it follows 
that the thing (or thought) and oneself together must, 
in every case, be the object, the true and complete object, 
of knowledge." Now this is the very inference which we 
deny. Self is not, and cannot be, a part of the object, 
so long as these two are distinguished by all men under 
heaven. No one can confound the two. The attempt 
to confound them is an insult to the universal intuitive 
reason of mankind. The author himself allows that 
they are " naturally and usually" distinguished. It is, 
in fact, only by giving a new meaning to the word object, 
by enlarging it, that the inference can be maintained. 
Because a thing can be known only provided oneself be 

1 " Theory of Knowing and Being," by Professor Ferrier. Proposi- 
tion II. 



OF PERSONAL IDENTITY AND OF MEMORY. 15 

known along with it, it does not follow that self is an 
object of knowledge, as that word is usually understood. 
The condition of all knowledge is not necessarily an ob- 
ject of knowledge. It may and must co-exist along with 
the object, but only the slightest reflection, or rather 
none at all, is required to distinguish them. To say 
that " Self is an integral and essential part of every 
object of cognition/' is a monstrous paradox, a contradic- 
tion in terms, a contradiction to the meaning of the word 
object Sometimes, indeed, self may be an object to self, 
as when we reflect on the operations of our own minds ; 
but this very case, by its difference from other cases, 
proves that self is not always, not necessarily, an object, 
or a part of an object. In this particular case, and in 
this alone, self is both subject and object. This Second 
Proposition, the first inference from the Primary Pro- 
position, contains, as we have said, all that is peculiar to 
the " Theory of Knowing and Being ;" and that infer- 
ence being shown to be fallacious, the whole system 
must perish. 

6. It thus appears that the startling and paradoxical 
air which pervades the whole of the " Theory of Know- 
ing and Being/' arises from giving a new and enlarged 
sense to the word object, a sense different from the na- 
tural or usual, as the author himself allows. But, as 
the writer cannot get rid of the old sense of the word, 
he immediately applies to it what holds good of the 
term in its new signification only ; and, so applied, the 
system becomes paradox and nonsense. If, on the other 
hand, the new sense be constantly held to, the " Theory" 
is frivolous, a mere change of nomenclature. Paradox 



16 INSTINCT. 

or insignificance, absurdity or nothing, u choose your 
horn." I have elsewhere said, " No error is more com- 
mon in Philosophy than by changing the meaning of a 
word to arrive at conclusions which wear the air of no- 
velty, while nothing may be really new but the altered 
signification of a term." 

In knowing any thing I cannot but know myself also. 
True. But that thing is either self or non-self. Let it 
be non-self, then the knowledge of the non-self is not the 
same as the knowledge of self; or the object differs from 
the subject. It is impossible to evade this argument but 
by denying that there is any thing in the word but 
self. If a non-self be allowed, the reasoning is irresis- 
tible. 

7. An acquaintance with the past which we obtain by 
memory, and an acquaintance with self, are two instinc- 
tive and fundamental articles of knowledge, which arise 
together, and are for ever inseparable. We cannot re- 
member any thing past, that is, in the first instance, 
some past state of consciousness, and through it some 
outward event, without knowing, in other words, believ- 
ing without doubt, that the subject who then was con- 
scious, and he who now remembers, is the same, the 
same, not merely similar, really One and Indivisible. So, 
we cannot believe in self without the remembrance of 
something before the present moment, some prior state 
of consciousness, belonging to that self. " I am the same 
man as I was yesterday," predicates sameness and supposes 
memory ; u and I remember the events of yesterday," 
precludes memory and supposes sameness of the subject. 
Thus knowledge of Personal Identity and knowledge of 



OF PERSONAL IDENTITY AND OF MEMORY. 17 

the Past are inseparably and necessarily bound up to- 
gether. 

8. These two articles of knowledge, Personal Identity, 
and some acquaintance with the Past, are fundamental, 
because they are the ground- work of all other knowledge. 
It is clearly impossible to know any thing beyond the 
present moment unless we know that we who now learn 
and we who formerly learnt are the same ; and it is also 
impossible to know what we formerly learnt without 
memory. Consequently, these two articles of knowledge 
are strictly fundamental. 

9. If there be any exception to the above truth it is 
in the case of intuitive knowledge, to be afterwards dwelt 
upon. When we assent to any self-evident maxim, such 
as " if equals be added to equals the wholes are equal/' or 
" two straight lines cannot enclose a space ;" it may be 
doubted whether any exercise of memory, any knowledge 
of self, be necessary. The mind appears to embrace the 
maxim at once without any reference to the past. This 
being allowed, it would follow that, strictly speaking, 
knowledge of self is not indispensable to all knowledge, 
that it does not always even co-exist with the knowledge 
of an object, much less form a part of that object, as 
Professor Ferrier maintains. 

10. These two co-existent and contemporaneous articles 
of knowledge are not only fundamental but instinctive ; 
as will readily appear by reference to our Criteria (Sec- 
tion I. 5). 

(1.) Knowledge of Self, and its concomitant Memory, 
are certainly original, not derived from any previous 
knowledge. They are got without effort, whether we 



18 INSTINCT. 

will or not, without seeking, without meditation ; they 
neither demand nor admit of logical proof. 

(2.) They are universal, held by all men without ex- 
ception, even by those who profess to doubt them. 

(3.) They are irresistible , proof against all sceptical 
arguments, though unanswerable ; for such arguments, 
however puzzling, are not demonstrative. We must 
yield to demonstration. 

(4.) They are not strictly self-evident like the axioms 
of mathematics, in other words, they are not discerned 
to be true. The contrary supposition involves no con- 
tradiction, and is therefore admissible ; it is no outrage 
to reason. Our sameness may be a delusion ; memory 
may deceive us ; though we cannot so believe. Eeason 
must allow the supposition to be just possible, but In- 
stinct forbids us to doubt. 



SECTION THIRD. 



KNOWLEDGE OF MATTER. 



1. Next in order to the knowledge of Self, and of past 
states of Consciousness, may be ranked the knowledge of 
Matter. Hitherto we have been acquainted only with 
our own minds, with the present and the past states 
thereof, and with that something which remains perman- 
ent amidst all modifications. So far, all is of a similar 
nature, all is immaterial, and though at the bottom every 



KNOWLEDGE OF MATTER. 19 

thing is mysterious, and imperfectly comprehensible, yet 
there appears no peculiar mystery in passing from one 
state of Consciousness to another. My own Being, the 
only one which I intimately know, is spiritual ; there 
may therefore be other spiritual Beings similar to myself 
in all respects ; there may be other spiritual Beings 
superior to myself; there may be One Great spiritual 
Being above all. These inferences are natural, nay, un- 
avoidable. The world of Spirits, then, is the one first 
open to us, through our own Consciousness, and by infer- 
ences therefrom, so far as we are able to make them. It 
is the first world revealed to us by Instinct, and the last 
which Beason should give up ; for we cannot abandon it 
without denying ourselves. If we be not spiritual, we 
are nothing. The world of Spirits, then, is the one of 
which we have the greatest certainty. 

2. But the world of spirits is not all. We are next 
introduced to a world of a very different sort, not only 
different, but opposed, the qualities of the one being a 
negation of the other. The one is material, the other 
immaterial ; that is, the one is extended, solid or im- 
penetrable, or occupying space, moveable, and infinitely 
divisible ; the other unextended, penetrable, or occupy- 
ing no space, consequently incapable of movement in 
space, and indivisible. 

3. Now, the great question is, how came we to know 
a thing so different from ourselves ? This does seem the 
mystery of mysteries ; and so it has appeared to thought- 
ful men ; for, while by some, theories have been formed 
to lessen the difficulty ; by others, the existence of matter 
has been called in question or even flatly denied. Ke~ 



20 INSTINCT. 

ferring to another work 1 for an account of the various 
theories framed to meet the difficulty, by softening down 
the distinction between Mind and Matter, by material- 
izing mind, or by immaterializing matter, or by inter- 
posing Deity, theories which complicate the mystery 
without removing it, we shall be content here to refer 
to those who profess to doubt or to disbelieve the exist- 
ence of the material world. 

4. Considering the wide and deep distinction between 
Mind and Matter, the awful gulph which lies between 
them, and hence the impossibility of an immediate 
knowledge of the latter ; these doubts seem at first not 
unreasonable. As soon as we begin to think upon the 
subject at all, we must see that all we know immediately 
is some state of our own Minds ; and how, from such a 
state, we get at something else utterly opposed in nature, 
does seem peculiarly incomprehensible. In vain do we 
attempt to throw a bridge over the chasm by means of 
sensible species or Ideas, whether those ideas pass directly 
from the object to us, or through the medium of the 
divine Mind ; we must at last leap the gulph which we 
had laboured to cross with ease. A very ingenious au- 
thor of the present day, already alluded to, has endea- 
voured to get over the abyss by filling it up, by effacing 
the distinction between Mind and Matter, but the ravine 
was too broad and too deep. 

5. But why must we leap the chasm which we cannot 
otherwise cross ? Why not remain on this side and 
refuse to trust ourselves to an unknown land, beset with 

1 See the Author's " Principles of Psychology." Part III., chap. 
III., Sect. 3, Of Perception. 



KNOWLEDGE OF MATTER. 21 

clouds and thick darkness ? Here, all is comparatively 
clear, there, all is mysterious, unlike to any thing which 
we intimately know. Myself I know, my thoughts and 
feelings I know ; but what is that which neither thinks 
nor feels ? Why believe in something without, which 
contradicts all within ? Surely this is too great a call 
on my credulity. A Spirit I am, and, without some 
powerful reason to the contrary, I will believe only in 
the world of spirits. 

6. But can you believe only in the world of spirits ? 
That I deny. Do what you will, strive against the belief 
with all your power, fortify your doubts by every con- 
ceivable argument, still the belief cannot really be shaken, 
certainty cannot be overthrown. You may assume a 
philosophic air, you may pride yourself on your superi- 
ority to vulgar prejudices, you may laugh at the credulity 
of the common herd ; but all this is mere pretence, a 
sham, a robe of state to cover a common garment. It is 
fine cambric concealing coarse linen. The fine cambric 
may be worn on days of ceremony, but the common linen 
cannot be dispensed with. The one is too frail for ordi- 
nary use, too cold for every day life ; it is but an ornament, 
a badge, to distinguish the wearer from the multitude. 

7. And what prevents me from doubting or disbeliev- 
ing the existence of the material world, which you allow 
is so foreign to my nature, so remote from Self ? to this 
there is but one answer, Instinct, Instinct, Instinct. A 
famous school of philosophy, the Scottish, has founded 
our belief in matter on common sense ; but, in no signi- 
fication that these words will bear, can this explanation 
or justification of the Belief be admitted. The word 



2£ INSTINCT. 

sense cannot here be used in its proper meaning, it must 
signify intellect in some form, not sensation. If it imply 
reason, then common sense will be that degree of reason 
which is common to all reasonable beings. But belief 
in the material world is not founded on reason, nor can 
it be justified thereby ; for it is held by the lowest ani- 
mals which have never been allowed to possess reason ; 
and reason can never show why the mental affections 
which I experience prove the existence of something 
totally different. To introduce reason, then, as at first 
a cause, and afterwards a justification of the belief, shows 
a total misconception of the subject. The Belief in 
question is not reasonable, but instinctive, and it has all 
the characteristics thereof. 

8. First, this belief, and the knowledge therein im- 
plied, is original, not derived from previous knowledge ; 
it is got without effort, whether we will or not, without 
seeking, without meditation; it neither demands nor 
admits of logical proof. 

Secondly, it is certainly universal, held by all men, 
even by those philosophers who profess to doubt, nay, 
by all animals without exception. 

Thirdly, it is irresistible, proof against all sceptical 
arguments, though unanswerable ; arguments, however, 
that are not demonstrative, and which, therefore, may 
be fallacious. 

Fourthly, it is not self-evident, not necessary, not 
discerned to be true ; and, therefore, it may be disputed 
without absurdity. 

This article of knowledge differs from Self knowledge 
in this, that the latter is essential to all knowledge, 



KNOWLEDGE OF MATTER. 23 

whereas the former is essential only to a knowledge of 
Matter and to physical science. 

If the above statement be correct, if the belief in 
matter be founded on an Instinct universal and irresis- 
tible, it necessarily follows that all expressed doubt thereof 
is merely verbal or nominal, not mental or real. Why 
then waste words, why endeavour to expel what has no 
hold in the breast ? Why attempt to prove what no 
one really questions ? A bond fide doubt we may meet, 
but a nominal doubt we should utterly disregard. The 
belief in the material world, like all instinctive beliefs, 
neither demands nor admits of logical proof; and to 
require such is at variance with that First Philosophy, 
which shows us the foundation of human knowledge, 
and the evidence proper to each department. Instinct 
is as imperative as Eeason ; we can no more resist the one 
than the other, though they act upon the mind differ- 
ently. Philosophia prima, the first philosophy, shows 
us that to doubt the evidence of instinct, is not, indeed, 
absurd, but impossible ; and if it is impossible, we must 
submit, though in words we seem to rebel. Better 
then is it, and more philosophic, openly to yield to our 
nature, than to do violence to our convictions, and glory 
in our scepticism at the expense of our sincerity. We 
believe, then, in the existence of the material world, we 
cannot help believing in it; and it is mere philoso- 
phical trifling to call in question what we never can 
really doubt. True, as this belief is not founded on 
reason, reason must allow that it may be groundless, 
but this thought can shake our conviction hardly for a 
passing moment. 



24 INSTINCT. 

SECTION FOURTH. 
KNOWLEDGE OF UNIFOBMITT IN NATUBE. 

1. Our knowledge of the material world could serve 
us but little, were we not, at the same time, impressed 
with the Belief of some uniformity in nature, that things 
which have once been conjoined, in space or in time, will 
be found conjoined again and again. 

2. This Belief, though truly instinctive, differs from 
the former in this respect, that it requires some experi- 
ence for its development ; for, unless we have seen one 
instance, at least, of such conjunction of phenomena, in 
space or in time, we cannot possibly expect another. 
This expectation, then, is an inference from Experience 
in each particular case ; but the tendency to draw such 
inferences is an Instinct of our nature, ready to show 
itself on the first occasion. It cannot be maintained 
that we are sufficiently acquainted with the nature of 
things to be able to show any reason for such uniform 
conjunction, whether of co-existence or of succession, 
whether in space or in time ; and children believe in 
uniform conjunction even from their earliest years. For 
ought we can see to the contrary, nature might have 
been a chaos, and the events of one day totally different 
from those of another. The ready tendency to believe 
in uniformity is shewn by this, that one instance of 
conjunction is enough. The child who has burnt his 
fingers once, will be more cautious about fire another 
time. We are, in fact, credulous in the extreme, and 



KNOWLEDGE OF UNIFORMITY IN NATURE. 25 

believe many conjunctions to be invariable, which are 
only casual. This is a main and deep-seated source of 
error. 

3. Sometimes Instinctive Knowledge is supposed where 
there is really none. Thus, because some animals avoid 
food injurious to them, wild plants, for instance, prior to 
all experience of their effects, they are said to avoid them 
by Instinct. But we cannot suppose it is from any fore- 
knowledge of the effects that those animals shun them, 
but merely from something disagreeable in the smell or 
taste. On the other hand, Knowledge is often attributed 
to Experience, while Experience was only the spark that 
set the train on fire. A match from the lantern of Gruy 
Fawkes might have sent the Houses of Parliament into 
the air, but the gunpowder must first have been com- 
pounded and set in order. So, had there not been an in- 
stinctive tendency to believe in uniformity, Experience 
would have been in vain. 

4. The word Experience is in everybody's mouth ; and 
it admits of great latitude of meaning. Strictly speaking, 
our experience is limited to the phenomena of our own 
minds, for these alone we know immediately, intimately, 
thoroughly. Hence, by an extension of meaning, we are 
said to have experience of things ontward, which we 
actually perceive, or have perceived, that is of particu- 
lar bodies, or particular changes in bodies, presented to 
the senses ; though such knowledge be not immediate, 
but obtained through certain phenomena of mind, by 
inference either instinctive or rational. By a farther 
extension of the term, a man of Experience comes to mean 
one who has not only perceived much and accurately, 



26 INSTINCT. 

but who has drawn many general conclusions from his 
perceptions. In Philosophy, the term Experience ought, 
certainly ; to be limited to the first two senses, if not to 
the first alone ; and in neither of these senses can the 
inference of permanent uniformity, which we draw from 
a particular instance of conjunction in space or in time, 
be attributed to Experience. Neither can it be ascribed 
to Eeason ; for why should nature be uniform ; why 
might it not be a chaos ? Can we pretend to know 
enough of the secrets of things to affirm the absurdity 
of the latter proposition. And if the inference be owing 
neither to Experience nor to Eeason, it must be attri- 
buted to Instinct. 

5. That the instinct in question often leads us 
astray, that it often conjoins things permanently which 
have only been united casually, is not disputed. Here, 
then, is the use of Experience. It serves either to 
correct or to confirm the Instinct. When our expecta- 
tions have been deceived, when phenomena once con- 
joined are found together no longer, we of course must 
give up our belief in the particular uniformity, and this 
correction may be attributed to Experience. On the 
other hand, when we have found the same phenomena 
conjoined again and again, Instinct is fortified, and 
Belief confirmed. Kepetition has a power of its own, it 
strengthens, but does not originate. A habit must 
begin in something which is not habit, but natural ten- 
dency; and so, Eepetition fortifies the tendency to believe 
in uniformity, supposing such tendency already to exist. 

6. Belief of uniformity in nature being not only highly 
important, but even indispensable to our existence, we 



KNOWLEDGE OF UNIFORMITY IN NATURE. 27 

cannot suppose that its origin should have been left to 
the slow growth of Eeason. But for this belief, the child, 
with all the care of his nurse and parents, never could 
have attained the age of manhood, never could have 
reached that age when Eeason is developed. It was 
then necessary for the continuance of the species that 
this knowledge should be instinctive. 

7. Does, then, this knowledge possess the character- 
istics of Instinct? First, this Belief and the Know- 
ledge therein implied certainly arises after a single in- 
stance of conjunction of phenomena ; and though this 
instance be matter of Experience, yet the Belief in the 
constant recurrence of such conjunction is Original, not 
derived from previous knowledge ; it is got without 
effort, whether we will or not, without seeking, without 
meditation ; it neither demands nor admits of logical 
proof. Were it true, as Hume supposes, that several 
instances of conjunction were necessary to create the 
Belief in future unvaried uniformity, still such belief 
could by no means be attributed to Eeason ; for Eeason 
can see no connection between past uniformity, however 
frequent, and constant uniformity in time to come ; and, 
consequently, some other principle, as Custom, must be 
called in to solve the difficulty. On this supposition, 
the Belief in question would be the result merely of 
Custom or constant association. But we have seen that 
one instance alone of conjunction suffices to create the 
Belief; and, therefore, neither Custom nor Eeason can 
explain the mystery. 

8. Secondly, Belief in certain uniformities in nature 
is universal, held by all men, even by those whose rea- 



28 INSTINCT. 

son is subverted, and by all animals. It is a remarkable 
corroboration of our doctrine, that Belief in the material 
world, and in the uniformity of nature, clings close even 
to those unhappy persons whose reason is clouded or 
extinguished. Persons in this situation are often quite 
able to take care of themselves so far as to avoid any 
obstacle or imminent danger ; and those who do destroy 
themselves, do so intentionally, proving by this very act 
that they know the common effects of common things. 
Nothing can show more clearly the distinction between 
Instinct and Keason. Of this distinction I have myself 
been a melancholy witness, 

9. Thirdly, the Belief in uniformity is in many cases 
irresistible, "irresistible as well as instantaneous upon 
the phenomena. 

10. Fourthly, this Belief is not self-evident, not ne- 
cessary, the fact is not discerned to be true ; and there- 
fore it may be called in question without absurdity 
No one can rightly affirm that it is absurd to say that 
the course of nature may change. Thus, Belief of unifor- 
mity in nature has all the characteristics of Instinctive 
Knowledge. 

11. This Belief is the foundation of all Science, that 
is of all general knowledge ; for science deals not in 
particulars, like Civil History, and Topography, but in 
general facts ; and, without the Belief of uniformity in 
the constitution and course of nature, all Knowledge 
would be particular, there could be no general results. 
Simple observation upon passing events would still give 
us information, but this information would be of no use, 
for it could tell nothing as to the future. It is the 



KNOWLEDGE OF OUR OWN FREE WILL. 29 

Mind, by an original and untaught power, which turns 
this information to account, that adds to the phenomena 
something entirely its own, something entirely distinct 
from sensation, distinct from perception, which believes, 
and cannot help believing, that the future will always 
be like the past. Thus, particular and barren informa- 
tion becomes general and useful knowledge ; observations 
once made are available for ever ; Experience becomes 
the guide of life ; and Observation with experiments 
raises up a body of science, to delight, adorn, and benefit 
mankind. We may say, then, with truth, that all useful 
knowledge with respect to matters of fact rests ulti- 
mately upon Faith, a Belief for which we can assign no 
reason. 



SECTION FIFTH. 
KNOWLEDGE OF OVE OWN FEEE WILL. 

1. Closely connected with the knowledge of our Per- 
sonal Identity is that of our own Free Will, which is 
really a part of the Knowledge of Self. We cannot 
know ourselves at all without knowing that we are free 
agents, at least without the firm belief that we are such, 
which may well be called Knowledge, as much as our 
belief in the existence of the material world, and our 
belief in the uniformity of nature. 

2. In the material world we believe that every change 
may be traced to some antecedent change as its cause, 



30 INSTINCT. 

and having once found that cause we believe that it 
will always be followed by the same effect, if no other 
cause intervene. Hence the anticipations of physical 
science are in numberless cases confident in the extreme. 
Every almanack is full of such anticipations, and they are 
always verified, generally with the nicest exactness. Not so 
in the case of human agency. We may guess, we may 
conjecture, we may even infer with much probability, how 
a person in a certain situation will act, but we never can 
be quite sure. Nay we never can predict with certainty 
how we ourselves shall act on any occasion. Whence 
this difference between the anticipations of Physical and 
of Moral Science ? The difference depends on this, that 
we believe ourselves and all other men to be endowed with 
a power of originating change, a power therefore which 
may baffie all our attempts at calculation founded on the 
causes which most commonly act upon the Will. The 
nice and endless differences of individuals, the whim, the 
caprice of the moment, never can be calculated; the 
power of originating never can be brought under the ex- 
act uniformity of a Law of Causation ; Mind can never 
be assimilated to Matter. Matter originates nothing, at 
least so we implicitly believe ; it only continues and 
propagates change everlastingly ; but Mind begins mo- 
tion and mental changes ; and this power is so wound up 
with our notion of Mind, that we cannot, if we would, 
separate the one from the other. 

3. That we all firmly believe ourselves and all other 
men to have Free Will, to be endowed with a power of 
orginating, not to be mere links in the chain of cause 
and effect, or simple instruments in the hands of a supe- 



KNOWLEDGE OF OUR OWN FREE WILL. 31 

rior power, is proved by the facts of Conscience in our 
own case ; and by the sentiments wherewith we regard 
the actions of others. Conscience, indeed, is not what 
some represent it, an infallible monitor and instructor, 
informing us of what is right and wrong in every case, 
a supreme judge or arbiter from whom there is no appeal ; 
for, it is unquestionable that some, like Eavaillac, and I 
may add Calvin, have done atrocious acts with the full 
approbation of Conscience, glorying in the deed, while 
many others have treated and do still treat their enslaved 
fellow-creatures worse than the brutes, without compunc- 
tion. But when we ourselves have done what we al- 
ready know, or at least fully believe to be right or wrong, 
there is that within us which always creates self-satisfac- 
tion or dissatisfaction on the retrospect, and this is Con- 
science, not an infallible instructor or guide, but a never- 
failing sanction of morality, tending to keep our acts in 
accordance with our notions, perfect or imperfect, of Duty. 
In like manner, when we review the actions of others we 
feel approbation or disapprobation, we praise or blame. 
Now what can Conscience, what can approbation or dis- 
approbation, praise or blame, mean, if men have no Free 
Will ? They certainly imply belief that we can do or 
not do as we please, that in a certain case we might have 
acted otherwise, that we are something more than consti- 
tuted parts of a machine, something more than levers, 
wheels, axles, or hydraulic rams, that we have the god- 
like power of originating change. And as Conscience in 
our own case, approbation or disapprobation, praise or 
blame, in that of others, are facts notorious as the sun, 



32 INSTINCT* 

extensive as the human race, so also must be the belief 
in the free agency of man. 

4. That the doctrine of Free Will is liable to great 
difficulties, is not disputed, but for our present purpose 
these difficulties are unimportant, if they do not interfere 
with the universal Belief of mankind. That is the only 
point which we are at present concerned to establish. 
For answers to these objections, sufficient, I think, though 
of course not demonstrative, I must refer to the chapter 
on the Will in my Principles of Psychology. There the 
subject is discussed in full. Our only object here is to note 
and confirm the fact of the universality of the Belief in our 
free agency, for this is required to prove the Instinctive 
Nature of that Belief. The question then now is, do the 
above difficulties really destroy the Catholic character of 
the doctrine ? 

5. That the freedom of Man's Will has been often 
disputed among philosophers, and that some have main- 
tained the opposite doctrine of Necessity, there is no 
doubt ; but the existence of the material world has also 
been doubted and even denied ; and yet we must allow 
that scepticism on this point does not in the least inter- 
fere with the real universality of the Belief. The amount 
of Belief bears to that of doubt an infinite ratio, as one 
to zero. Moreover, we are certain as to the Belief, but 
we never can be sure of the reality of the doubt ; for we 
know well that opinions are often broached by philoso- 
phers more from a love of singularity, a desire of dis- 
tinction, a contempt of the vulgar, than from conviction. 
It is natural for those, " who cannot add anything to 
Truth, to seek for eminence through the heresies of 



KNOWLEDGE OF OUR OWN FREE WILL. 33 

paradox." And they often succeed, for men are caught 
by the new and the startling, while they turn with in- 
difference from the old and the true. We may well 
doubt whether all the excellence of the Recherche de la 
verite would have obtained for Malebranche a due re- 
ward of renown, had it not contained the astonishing 
theory of seeing all things in God; or whether all the 
acuteness and all the charm of Berkeley would have 
gained for him a never-dying celebrity, had he not 
denied the outward existence of Matter. So, Hume rose 
into notoriety by denying that miracles ever could be 
credible. 

Besides, those very philosophers, even the most scep- 
tical, talk and act, and seem to think, on all ordinary 
occasions, just like other men. When they quit their 
closet they leave their doubts behind them. What pa- 
tron of Necessity ever expressed himself in practical cases 
of morality differently from other people ? Who ever 
ceased to feel approbation or disapprobation, or to assign 
praise or blame to certain actions, because he denied 
freedom to the Will? Thus, professed doctrine and 
conduct were in open contradiction, Philosophy and Na- 
ture, Eeason and Instinct constantly opposed. Nay, an 
eminent metaphysician, who has lately propounded a 
startling theory, maintains that Philosophy ought not to 
leave the closet, that it is for private meditation only, not 
for the world at large, for speculation not for use, and 
that out of his sanctum the philosopher is a pedant and a 
bore. He must pass his speculative life in a world of his 
own — a world of enchantment no doubt ; for woe to him 
if he carry his illusions abroad. He will be gazed and 



34 INSTINCT. 

laughed at if lie merely enounce his opinions, but if he 
act upon them, he will be clapped into Bedlam. Or, he 
will have the fate of Alnaschar, who, lost in reverie, 
kicked all his glass and crockery into the street. 

6. What seems a more weighty objection to the doc- 
trine of the universality of the belief in Free Will, is the 
fact that certain religious sects, and even whole nations, 
have adopted a contrary opinion. Thus, while the Sad- 
ducees, according to Josephus, 1 held the doctrine of Free 
Will in all its integrity, the Pharisees combined it with a 
belief in destiny; and other sects, as the rigid Calvinists, 
and even a whole people, as the Turks, maintain the 
doctrine of Fatalism. In these instances, we see, to a 
remarkable extent, the effect of reason, right or wrong, 
in overcoming instinct, so far as to establish an opinion 
in direct contradiction to the latter ; but it is only an 
opinion, and an opinion inconsistent with every-day sen- 
timent, speech, and action ; for, what individual, what 
sect, what nation, because they believed in predestina- 
tion, ever ceased to feel, speak, and act like other people ? 
Could a few instances be produced of individuals who, 
in some period of unusual excitement, have stifled the 
instincts of nature in obedience to a favourite theory, 
these instances must be regarded as extraordinary phe- 
nomena, occasioned by extraordinary causes, forming no 
exception worth speaking of to the countless sum of con- 
trary facts. The power of Instinct is eminently shown 
in this, that it acts even when the Eeason is convinced 
to the contrary, that it triumphs over false theories, and 
though it cannot stop speculation, renders it utterly at 
1 Wars of the Jews, Book II. chap. 12. 



KNOWLEDGE OF OUR OWN FREE WILL. 35 

variance with practice. Are rigid Calvinists, are Turks, 
free from the stings of conscience because they believe in 
predestination ? Do they feel, do they express no indig- 
nation against the betrayer or the oppressor ? Do they 
cease to believe themselves accountable for their words 
and actions ? If not, then their whole moral life is at 
war with their reason. 

7. That certain individuals, and even sects, should 
endeavour to persuade themselves, in opposition to In- 
stinct, that the Will is not free, and that man is subject 
to Necessity or Fate, is not surprising. How agreeable 
to the natural depravity of human nature to suppose 
that we are not accountable for our actions ! how plea- 
sant to think that we are predestined to everlasting hap- 
piness ! how gratifying to believe that we are the especial 
favourites of Heaven ! What can feed pride more than 
the latter supposition ? It is not our real deserts that 
minister to pride so much as our supposed advantages 
over others, even those of a frivolous nature. Keal merit 
is its own reward; it gives that inward and heartfelt 
satisfaction which requires no fictitious support ; while 
doubtful and petty superiority needs to be propped up by 
pride. Thus, virtuous actions do not make men arro- 
gant ; but belief in the favour of heaven, independently 
of our own doings, engenders spiritual pride, the bane of 
true religion. To be the predestined favourite of heaven 
is of course a great superiority, but it can always be 
questioned by others, and must at times seem doubtful 
even to the individual. Therefore it must be openly 
assumed and dwelt upon in order to impose upon the 
world as well as upon self. The Jews looked upon them- 



36 INSTINCT. 

selves as the chosen people of God, and nothing could be 
more mortifying to them than the doctrine of Christianity, 
which put all mankind upon an equality. No wonder 
then that they shut their ears to the truth of the gospel, 
and even persecuted to the death those who maintained 
that there was no longer any distinction between Jew 
and Gentile. 

8. The universality of the belief in the free and there- 
fore accountable agency of man is proved by the lan- 
guage of all people in all ages. All languages abound in 
words of praise and blame, proving belief in merit and 
demerit, and consequently in free-will, for, take away 
free-will, and praise and blame are utterly misapplied. 
To this it may be replied, that though there be no such 
thing in reality as merit and demerit, yet praise and 
blame have their use by acting as motives to the Will, 
encouraging useful and discouraging noxious actions. 
No doubt such is the final cause or purpose of Moral 
Sentiment ; but to deny the existence of merit and de- 
merit is to belie the universal sentiment of mankind, 
(against which in morals it is vain to appeal,) and to 
suppose that we are the fools and dupes of nature, which 
has made us such that we can no more get rid of the 
notion of merit and demerit, than we can change our 
skin. Cl These sentiments are so rooted in our constitu- 
tion and temper that, without entirely confounding the 
human mind by disease or madness, it is impossible to 
extirpate and destroy them/' 1 Praise and blame serve, no 
dotibt, a great moral purpose, they are useful in the 
highest degree ; but without the belief in merit and 
1 Hume, " Treatise of Human Nature," Book III, Sect. 2. 



KNOWLEDGE OF OUR OWN FREE WILL. 37 

demerit, and consequently in free agency, we could nei- 
ther praise nor blame. 

9. It must then be allowed, after a due consideration 
of all objections, that no amount of real disbelief in the 
Free Will of man exists, worthy to be set against the 
overwhelming sum of belief, so as to make any material 
deduction from the latter. Therefore, one character- 
istic of Instinctive Knowledge, universality, belongs to 
the belief in the free agency of man. 

Secondly, This belief is certainly irresistible; for we 
have seen that it is proof against all arguments addressed 
to the reason, how ingenious, how powerful soever they 
may be. These arguments, though never demonstrative, 
may stagger us ; they may be difficult to answer ; they 
may make converts to a philosophical tenet, but they 
have little or no influence on our moral sentiments and 
actions ; and, therefore, we may infer that they do not 
really convince. They may please a speculative mind ; 
they may gratify a love of singularity and notoriety; 
they may raise up a philosophical master and give a 
name to his disciples ; but they must bow to the power 
of Nature ; and Eeason in all its pride, with all its wiles, 
must yield to the simplicity of Instinct. 

Thirdly, Belief in our Freedom of Will is assuredly 
original, not derived from any previous knowledge, 
neither learnt by experience, nor inferred by reason, not 
developed by years, but as strong in infancy as in age. 
All that reason has done is to endeavour to shake the 
belief; and this endeavour has signally failed, even with 
those who maintained the adverse opinion. Their sen- 



38 INSTINCT. 

tirnents, words, and actions, at every moment belied 
their speculative dogma. 

Fourthly , The belief in question is not self-evident to 
reason, not necessary, not discerned to be true; and, 
therefore, it may be, and often has been, called in ques- 
tion, not only without absurdity, but even with much 
show of plausible argument. 

Thus, Belief in the Free Will of man has all the cha- 
racteristics of Instinctive Knowledge. 

10. As knowledge of Self and trust in Memory are the 
foundation of all knowledge, faith in the uniformity of 
nature the base of all science, and belief in the material 
universe the ground of all physical science, so the cer- 
tainty of Free Will lies at the bottom of all morality. 
All ethics suppose men to be free ; that he can do or not 
do certain actions at his good pleasure, proprio motu 7 
without being subject to any inexorable law ; that certain 
acts have therefore merit or demerit, are virtuous or 
vicious, worthy of praise or blame ; that consequently men 
ought to be rewarded for the one, punished for the other. 
These sentiments are indisputable and universal. The acts 
deemed virtuous or vicious may vary a little in different 
ages and countries, that is, the object of the sentiment 
may vary, but the sentiment is everywhere to be found. 
Now, do away with man's Free Will, and the sentiment is 
nonsense. To award praise or blame to one who cannot 
regulate his own actions is simply absurd. Freedom of 
the Will is then the foundation of ethics. 

11. Accordingly, those who upset the liberty of man 
have demolished ethics along with it. Thus Hobbes, 
the necessitarian pure, the nominalist par excellence, 



KNOWLEDGE OF OUR OWN FREE WILL. 39 

boldly affirms that might is right, which means that 
morality, properly and usually so called, is a delusion or 
a sham. Hobbes cannot be said to have any system of 
ethics, but only a system of policy, and his policy anni- 
hilates ethics. Yet even he is constrained to write like 
other people, whenever his theory is not actually before 
him, nor could he have done otherwise without creat- 
ing a language for himself. It is impossible to talk of 
men and their actions without using words which imply 
merit or demerit, or express praise or blame, not a mere 
intellectual decision as to the tendency of these actions. 
It has been well said by Bentham, " right or wrong, in a 
good cause, or in a bad, nothing is so rare as consistency/' 
Having annihilated ethics, it might naturally be sup- 
posed, and it has been supposed, that Hobbes has de- 
molished religion along with them. But this would be a 
rash conclusion. One half of the Leviathan is taken up 
with Christian politics and the Christian religion, nor 
does there seem to be any reason to doubt the sincerity 
of the author, except that his other opinions seem incon- 
sistent with religious belief ; but according to the dictum 
of Bentham this is no sure ground of inference. Hobbes 
was an immoral Theist, not an Atheist ; and he may have 
been even a Christian. Certainly, one half of his great 
work is taken up with fixing the principles of Christian- 
ity, and the respectful terms in which he uniformly men- 
tions the Holy Scriptures are a better proof of his faith 
than any argument drawn from his inconsistency is of 
the contrary. Hobbes was a bold man in the expression 
of his opinions, he promulgated the most startling doc- 
trines without reserve or limitation ; in Metaphysics the 



40 INSTINCT. 

doctrine of necessity, in Morals that of might as the foun- 
dation of right, in Politics the unlimited power of one 
as the best possible government ; can we therefore sup- 
pose that he would have concealed his religious opinions, 
had they been hostile to Christianity ; nay, that he would 
have devoted one half of his Leviathan to the exposition 
of its principles ? But so it is ; opinions are often attri- 
buted to men, not that they have actually maintained 
them, but because they are supposed to be legitimate 
conclusions from other opinions which they are known to 
hold. The reader will pardon this digression, for it 
seemed of some importance to show that irreligious opi- 
nions had been erroneously attributed to Hobbes, and 
that so deep a thinker was no disbeliever in Christianity. 



SECTION SIXTH. 
BELIEF IN HUMAN TESTIMONY. 

1. The last original source of knowledge to be here 
mentioned is that of Belief in Human Testimony, This 
knowledge differs from the foregoing inasmuch as it comes 
to us second-hand, through others, and not by the native 
powers of our own mind, unlike the knowledge of self, 
of facts remembered, of the material universe, of uni- 
formity in nature, and of our own Free Will. For these 
we require no voucher, no confirmation by others; our 
own mind gives us all the certainty we can desire. But 



BELIEF IN HUMAN TESTIMONY. 41 

the present belief, from its very nature, hangs upon 
others, and without others can have no existence. 

2. Though the knowledge thus obtained may be said 
to be not indigenous but of foreign growth, not original, 
but derived, yet the tendency to believe, on which it is 
founded, is truly instinctive. 

First, this tendency is certainly original, not derived 
from any previous knowledge, not the result of experi- 
ence, for the child at first believes implicitly, without 
hesitation, whatever he is told. Doubt in testimony, on 
the contrary, is of slow growth, feeble at the commence- 
ment, easily crushed, but gradually strengthening as ex- 
perience proves that men do not always speak the truth, 
either through ignorance or design. 

Secondly, Belief in Human Testimony is in early child- 
hood universal, for no one can point out a child who 
began by doubting what was told him. Credulity is the 
never failing accompaniment of our tender years. 

Thirdly, this Belief is at first irresistible as well as 
instantaneous. The child cannot help believing what 
his parents or his nurse may tell him, and that too at the 
moment, without demur, without hesitation. 

Lastly, this Belief is not self-evident, not necessary, 
not discerned to be well founded, and therefore it may 
be, and as we get older, very frequently is called in ques- 
tion, without absurdity. Consequently, Belief in Human 
Testimony has all the characteristics of Instinct. 

3. And this Instinct is necessary to the well-being, 
nay, to the preservation of the human race. As a long 
time must elapse before the child can judge for himself, 
it is essential that he place entire reliance on all that is 



42 INSTINCT. 

told him ; for though this may not always be true, yet 
it is generally intended for his benefit, and some guid- 
ance must be better than none. What would become 
of human life if Doubt, not Belief, were the first law of 
our nature ? All early education is built upon an un- 
reasoning Belief or Faith in the pupil, for Eeason is not 
yet sufficiently awake to distinguish the true from the 
false; so that, without Faith, education could do nothing. 
Thus, no doubt, error may be inculcated, and prejudice, 
at all events, there must be ; but prejudice and even error 
are preferable to a total blank, and to the absence of all 
rules of life. Education always aims at what is good, 
and teaches what is believed to be true ; and that it does 
not always achieve good, or propagate truth, is the result 
of our fallible nature. What would a child be without 
prejudice? His intellect would be stunted, his moral 
nature depraved, from a want of some food for the under- 
standing, of some guide to the emotions. Even a man 
without prejudice, that is, without some blind partiality 
for certain opinions and persons, will be a heartless in- 
dividual, without warmth, without sincerity, without 
energy. " Savez-vous," dit M. de Talleyrand, "pourquoi 
j'aimeassezMontrond? c'est parce qu' il a peude prejuges." 
" Savez-vous/' dit M. de Montrond, " pourquoi j'aime 
M. de Talleyrand ? c'est parce qu' il n'en a point du tout." 
Just so ; Talleyrand was a specimen of a man without 
prejudice, attached to nothing but his own interest. 
What is called national sentiment must in the majority 
be a prejudice, or rather an assemblage of prejudices ; 
but without such a sentiment, there may be a collection 
of individuals, but there is no nation. Loyalty is a pre- 



BELIEF IN HUMA^T TESTIMONY. 43 

judice in favour of a particular family ; but in a mon- 
archy, how important, how salutary is that prejudice ! 
What a bar to rivalry and civil war ! What a source 
of security ! The politically degraded are unprejudiced 
enough, they care only for him, be he Bourbon or Bona- 
parte, who will ennoble or enrich them ; they hoist, as 
it suits their turn, the white flag, the tricolor, or the 
red ; yet they still may have some national sentiment. 
In the last stage of degradation this also disappears, and 
each man sees clearly, and cares not to conceal, the vices 
and misery of his own countrymen. 

4. These then are the six grand articles of Belief, to 
be attributed to Instinct not to Beason, which are before 
all the lessons of Experience, though some of them may 
subsequently be confirmed or modified thereby ; which 
themselves form the most important part of our know- 
ledge, and are indispensable to all future progress ; which 
precede and prepare the growth of Beason, the other 
grand source of Knowledge, and afterwards, hi conjunc- 
tion with Beason, enable the now mature mind to profit 
by Experience. For it is notorious that many, even of 
full age, profit little by Experience, because they do 
not reflect. Experience alone is of no avail, it is the 
mind which supplies what is wanting to make Experi- 
ence fruitful, either by means of some instinctive belief, 
or some exercise of Beason. Thus, in reality, Instinct 
and Beason are the only sources of Knowledge. The 
sources of Knowledge must be in the Mind itself. 



PART SECOND. 

REASON. 
CHAPTER I. 

OF RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 

1. In the second chapter of the former part of this 
work, we divided Knowledge into the Instinctive and 
the Rational ; and, accordingly, the first part has been 
given up to the consideration of Instinct, one of the 
two grand sources of all knowledge. We have now to 
treat of the other source, of Reason, that divine eman- 
ation whereby man rises far above all the rest of the 
animal creation, by superiority in degree, if not by ex- 
clusive possession ; a superiority so great as to establish 
him as it were God of this lower world, as much raised 
above the brutes as he is below his Great Creator. That 
man can rise to the conception of one Great Being, Maker 
of Heaven and Earth, and of all that therein is, is itself 
the greatest proof of his superiority, the indisputable 
evidence of his own grandeur, in the midst of all his 
misery and littleness. This magnificent conception the 
Atheist treats as a delusion ; he plumes himself on his 



OF RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 45 

positive knowledge, much of which is merely instinctive, 
and rejects the grandest fact which reason has made 
known to us, showing thus a perversion of Intellect as 
well as a poverty of Soul. l 

2. At the opening of his Chapter " Of Reason," Locke 
makes the following statement : " The word Reason, in 
the English language, has different significations ; some- 
times it is taken for true and clear principles, — sometimes 
for clear and fair deductions from those principles, — and 
sometimes for the cause, and particularly for the final 
cause. But the consideration I shall have of it here is 
in a signification different from all these ; and that is, 
as it stands for a Faculty in man, that faculty whereby 
man is supposed to be' distinguished from beasts, and 
wherein it is evident he much surpasses them/' 1 

3. The nature of this faculty it is now our task to 
determine. Throughout the chapter, of which the above 
sentence is the commencement, Season is constantly 
taken to be synonymous with reasoning, or nearly in 
the second sense above stated. It is clear, therefore, 
that Locke does not accomplish what he promised, that 
he fixes no meaning to the term different from those 
meanings before enumerated, that he tells us not what 
Keason is but Reasoning. This is particularly clear 
from Sect. 17. of the above chapter, where Intuitive is 
distinguished from Rational Knowledge. Now Reason- 
ing is a part, or rather one of the functions of Reason, 
but not the whole ; and, therefore, an account of the 
one cannot serve for the other. 

4. Since Reasoning is universally allowed to belong 
1 Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book IV. chap. 17. 



46 REASON. 

to Season, and is properly the most complex form 
thereof, by examining the nature of Seasoning, and by 
eliminating what is peculiar to it, we may rise to the 
conception of Eeason in general. Now, in all Season- 
ing, of whatever kind it may be, some connection is seen 
between one proposition and another, so that if the one 
be true, the other will be true also, or false, true or false, 
certainly or probably, as the case may be. Such is the 
essence of all Seasoning; two Propositions at least, 
mentally comprehended, if not stated in words, and a 
seen connection between them, so that the one establishes 
or upsets the other. But how do we see the connection ? 
How ? That is a question to which no one can give an 
answer, for it admits of none. The understanding must 
begin somewhere, must have a native force, a power of 
distinguishing one thing from another, of discerning 
incompatibilities, or it never could acquire any know- 
ledge. All teaching supposes a mind already capable 
of learning, endued with an original energy; and we 
could as well teach a blind man to distinguish colours, 
as a man without Eeason to reason. The proper name 
for this mental clearsightedness is Intuition. In all 
reasoning then we have the comprehension of two pro- 
positions at least, and intuition of a relation between 
them. 

5. But Intuition is not confined to the discerning of 
relation between one proposition and another; it also 
sees at once a relation, whether of agreement or disagree- 
ment, between one Notion and another, and so between 
the Things made known to us through our notions. Thus 
does the mind see intuitively that Subject and Object, 



OF RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 47 

Self and Non-self, the Material and the Immaterial, are 
different. Whatever may be the principles or causes of 
Mental Phenomena, we cannot confound thought and 
emotion with a thing extended and solid. So, we must 
allow that the notion of two straight lines is incompa- 
tible with that of space enclosed, for which three, at least, 
are indispensable. These and innumerable other agree- 
ments and disagreements we see at once, intuitively, by 
Keason, but without reasoning. 

6. From the foregoing scrutiny it appears, that Intui- 
tion is the faculty of discerning agreement or disagree- 
ment between notions or conceptions and so between 
things conceived, as well as between propositions ex- 
pressive of the relations of notions or of things ; and this 
Intuition is the very essence of Keason. 

7. But to this Intuition two other faculties are sub- 
sidiary, the faculty of Conception, and that of Compre- 
hension. It is evident, that, without clear conceptions 
we cannot discern at once the agreement or disagree- 
ment of one conception, or of one thing conceived, with 
another ; and without distinctly comprehending the 
meaning of a proposition, we cannot see whether it be 
true or false, and whether it agree with another or not. 
Now the faculty of Conception, though subsidiary and 
indispensable to Eeason, may exist without it, and 
actually does exist without it, in the insane and the 
fatuous; but Comprehension of a relation, or the un- 
derstanding of the words in which it is expressed, as 
embracing a certain knowledge of Eelation, must be 
attributed to Eeason. That we can comprehend a pro- 
position or understand its meaning without forming any 



48 SEASON. 

decision as to its truth or falsehood, is evident from this, 
that we may understand all the enunciations of Euclid, 
before we study the proof. Thus I can comprehend 
that the three angles of every triangle may be equal to 
two right angles, whether I know them to be so or 
not. 1 

7. This only must be noted, it is only where pro- 
positions not self-evident are concerned, that Compre- 
hension can be distinguished from Intuition as to truth 
or falsehood ; where propositions are self-evident, the 
two are inseparably blended. Thus, if I understand the 
proposition, " two straight lines cannot enclose a space/' 
I must also see that it is true ; but I may comprehend 
the enunciation, "in every right angled triangle, the 
square of the side opposite to the right angle is equal 
to the squares of the two containing sides," without being 
convinced of its certainty. So, if I am told that the 
Nile is larger than the Danube, I can perfectly compre- 
hend the assertion, though I know not whether it be 
well founded. Thus, comprehension of relation, and 
intuition as to agreement or disagreement, whether of 
notion with notion, of things with things, or of relation 
with relation, seems to be the whole of Eeason. 

8. Seeing then that Comprehension is essential to 
every act of Eeason, and that it may even exist without 
Intuition as to truth or falsehood, it may be called 
Reason in embryo, leading on to the perfect plant, which 
combines Intuition with bare Comprehension. Eeason, 
in its developed state, may be divided into simple and 

1 See more on this subject in the Author's " Principles of Psych- 
ology." Part III., chap. 7. 



OF RATIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. 49 

complex Intuition, (each of course embracing Compre- 
hension) the former discerning relations between No- 
tions and Notions, or Things and Things, the latter dis- 
cerning the Relations of Eelations, and consequently em- 
bracing the former and something more, and commonly 
called Reasoning. Milton talks of Reason as either 
Intuitive or Discursive, meaning by the latter Reason- 
ing, and this distinction agrees with the above ; yet the 
words fail to note that a mental condition, properly called 
Intuition, is common to both ; that a discerning of the 
connection between one Proposition and another is akin 
to the discerning of the connection of one Notion or of 
one Thing with another ; and that in both cases the pro- 
per name for this native mental clearsightedness is In- 
tuition. 1 But these two phases of Reason must be 
treated separately. Though the full moon embraces the 
half-moon, yet the half-moon differs from the full. 

1 The passage in Milton is as follows, being part of the speech of the 
angel to Adam : — 

" Whence the soul 
Reason receives, and Reason is her being, 
Discursive or intuitive ; discourse 
Is oftest yours, the latter most is ours, 
Differing but in degree, of kind the same." 

Paradise Lost, Book V., line 487 



CHAPTEK II 



OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 

1. The knowledge which we obtain by simple Intui- 
tion is, like knowledge in general, either Certain or Pro- 
bable, but in all cases it is original, not derived from any- 
previous knowledge. Simple Intuition is therefore strictly 
a source of knowledge, as Instinct is another, and the two 
are quite different. By instinct we believe, and firmly be- 
lieve many things, so firmly that we can say and do say 
that we not merely believe but know them ; but we can- 
not tell why we believe ; we can see no connection be- 
tween the notions or the things which we unite, though 
from long custom we think them inseparable, and can 
with difficulty be brought to allow that there is no neces- 
sary connection between them: but by Intuition we 
mentally discern that two notions, or two things, are re- 
lated, in other words, our Keason is satisfied. It is evident 
that Keason, like Instinct, must begin with truths which 
support themselves, as a building must rest on self-sus- 
taining ground ; that there cannot be a perpetual sue- 



OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 51 

cession of proofs any more than of bases, and therefore 
that there are first truths which we either blindly be- 
lieve or rationally discern. The former admit of no 
proof, and the latter require none. The first we have 
already considered, the last we shall now investigate. 

2. Simple Intuitive knowledge, as we have said, is 
either Certain or Probable, To the former category be- 
long, in the first place, what are called the Axioms of 
Mathematics or the Science of Quantity, such as " Things 
which are equal to the same, are equal to one another." 
" If equals be added to equals, or subtracted from equals, 
the wholes, or the remainders, will be equal." " If unequals 
be added to equals the whole will be unequal," and many 
more such, as well as that axiom proper to geometry 
" two straight lines cannot enclose a space." These and 
other similar axioms we discern at once to be true, as soon 
as the terms are understood ; we discern them to be true 
certainly, to be true absolutely, independently of time and 
circumstance, to be true for ever ; and all this without 
any teaching except the meaning of the words, by the 
native power of the mind, in a word by Eeason. All 
the arguments in the world could neither shake nor in- 
crease our conviction of these truths, which are not only 
self-evident, but necessary, that is independent of time 
or change of circumstances. Without such a conviction 
mathematical science could not advance one step, it must 
remain for ever an ingenious supposition, like the ma- 
chines of Archimedes without a fulcrum; but given the 
conviction of those simple truths, the system of the world 
may be discovered, though it cannot be moved from its 
course. 



52 KEASON. 

3. The self-evident and necessary nature of the pro- 
positions above-mentioned and of others similar, depends 
upon this, that they express the relations of abstract no- 
tions, and are independent of actual matter of fact. All 
that is required is to have clear and complete notions of 
the Universals which these notions represent, and as in 
matter of Quantity such clear and complete notions are 
attainable, the agreement or disagreement of any two 
such notions is at once apparent. Here, Simple In- 
tuitive knowledge, as far as it goes, is perfect. 1 

4. But there other primary propositions, where mat- 
ter of fact is introduced, and where, accordingly, on the 
ground of our ignorance, there may be some room for 
doubt. So long as our attention is confined to those 
abstract notions which the mind makes for itself, and 
which it can perfectly conceive, so long our intuitions 
concerning them are free from all source of error ; but 
when we look beyond the mind itself to the world with- 
out, we embark at once upon a sea where we may readi- 
ly lose our way. What is purely mental the mind can 
thoroughly know ; but what is without, it can never know 
but imperfectly. Therefore Mathematics, or the Science 
of Quantity, which treats of the modes or modifications of 
time and space, and their relations, without any reference 
to the material world, and Psychology, or the science of 
mind and its phenomena, are susceptible of the nearest 

1 It may create surprise that a vast system of Natural Philosophy 
and Astronomy should be raised on abstractions : but Natural Philoso- 
phy, as well as Mental, is based upon facts, observed and generalised, 
and Mathematics come in merely as a handmaid or assistant, as a ma- 
chine for calculating Quantity ; without which, however, no progress in 
Natural Philosophy could have been made. 



OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 53 

approach to perfection, how far soever the latter may at 
present fall short of that high position. Difficulties 
arising from the fleeting nature of mental phenomena, 
their indistinctness, their endless variety, their multifari- 
ous combinations, and the ambiguity of terms, may long 
retard the advance of psychology, but the subject of the 
science is clearly within our ken. 

5. But when we turn to the world without, to the mate- 
rial universe, we soon see that our knowledge is imperfect, 
and must always remain so. What Matter is we can 
know only as it affects us, or through mental phenomena, 
that is mediately, not immediately as we know those phe- 
nomena themselves ; and what is known but mediately can 
be known but imperfectly. What changes the object may 
undergo in passing through the medium, and what never 
transpires through that medium, we cannot tell. There- 
fore, from the very nature of the subject, not from the 
difficulties attending the study, Physical Science, in spite 
of its tangible results, in spite of its positive pretensions, 
is, and always must be, imperfect. We may know a 
great deal more, and more accurately ; but we never can 
raise the veil which separates Matter from Mind. 

6. Besides, when we look beyond ourselves, abroad and 
around, if we think at all, we must be struck with the 
depth of our ignorance. Nothing but what is out of the 
common course of things strikes the unthinking mind, 
and rouses wonder ; but that common course itself stupi- 
fies the man of reflection. The thought of the world we 
inhabit revolving in space with perfect regularity, and 
maintaining an uninterrupted succession of seasons, es- 
sential to every thing that has life, while but a slight ir- 



54 KEASON. 

regularity would be total ruin; the consideration of 
vegetable and animal life, in all its forms and varieties, 
past and present, historical and actual, fossil and ex- 
isting ; the reflection that of all the multitudes of men 
and of other animals born upon the face of the earth, 
few, very few, comparatively, are maimed or imperfect, 
each bearing a near resemblance, in all important partic- 
ulars, to others of the same kind ; the fact that there are 
kinds or species, always alike, always different from other 
kinds or species ; these and innumerable other facts are 
enough to overwhelm the Intellect, to confound the Eea- 
son. To the questions, how did these things begin ? 
how are they maintained ? what answer can we give. 
We must confess that all nature, every thing around, is 
an inscrutable mystery. 

7. Such being our general Ignorance, and our igno- 
rance of Matter in particular, how can we venture to say 
what is, and what is not impossible ? 

8. But, besides our ignorance, which incapacitates us 
from judging at all with respect to possibility or impos- 
sibility, there is a principle in the mind which tends to 
mislead us in regard to what is, and what is not, possible. 
This is the tendency to suppose that the world without 
is an exact counterpart of the world within us ; that 
things constantly associated in our minds are necessarily 
joined in reality ; that what we can conceive is possible, 
what we cannot, impossible. This has even been carried 
so far as to raise up as the Criterion of possibility the 
power of representing things in the mind as visible 
objects. On this ground, even a great class of mental 
phenomena has been called in question, and because we 



OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 55 

cannot form a mental picture of General Notions, they 
have been declared impossible. 

9. It is remarkable that even Hume, with all his ac- 
uteness, should have fallen into this trap. The sceptical 
philosophy of his Treatise of Human Nature is entirely 
grounded on two assumptions. 1. That every Idea, at 
least every simple idea, is the copy of an Impression. 2. 
That our Ideas or Conceptions are a sure criterion of the 
reality of things, that what we cannot conceive cannot 
exist. Starting from these premises, Hume infers that 
we have no separate independent Ideas of Substance, 
Time, and Space, because we have no Impressions there- 
of ; and if we have no Ideas of these, they do not exist. 
Thus Substance, including Mind and Matter, Soul and 
Body, is got rid of. On the same grounds he denies the 
infinite divisibility of matter supposing it to exist. " It 
is evident," says he, "'that as no Idea of Quantity is 
infinitely divisible, there cannot be imagined a more 
glaring absurdity than to endeavour to prove that Quan- 
tity itself admits of such division/' 1 Here the fallacy 
comes out to the light of day. 

10. It is not a little curious that the two fundamental 
assumptions of Hume above mentioned embrace two 
fallacies of a nature diametrically opposed. By the one 
which we have already considered, the world within is 
made the criterion of the world without, the standard of 
what is possible, and this may be called an Immaterial 
or Spiritual system ; by the other, according to which 

1 Treatise of Human Nature. Book I., Part II., Sect. 2, 3, 4. Hume 
may have modified his opinions afterwards, but these were his first 
views. 



56 REASON. 

every Idea is the copy of an Impression, that is of a Sen- 
sation, the mind is subjected to matter to such a degree 
as to destroy all independent action, all formation of gen- 
eral notions or of relations, all conception of Matter, of 
Mind, of Deity. This, then, is a system of Materialism. 
The system is somewhat improved, if Impression be 
taken to mean not simply Sensation but Perception ; 
yet, even then, it is a miserably narrow one, and binds 
the mind too much to outward things. If Impression 
embrace not only Sensation and Perception, but also Emo- 
tion, the improvement is greater, for Emotion has no 
necessary connection with things outward, and therefore 
the system departs farther from materialism. And, in 
justice to Hume, it must be admitted that he took Im- 
pressions in this wider sense, for he divides them into 
those of Sensation and those of Reflection^ meaning by 
the latter, as he tells us, " desire and aversion, hope and 
fear/' •' passions, desires, and emotions," derived, as he 
states, not directly from the impressions of Sense, but 
from the ideas of those impressions by Keflection, and so 
removed from matter. 1 Thus Hume does allow to the 
mind a native power, which he calls Keflection, whereby 
Emotions arise ; though he denies that it can form any 
notion of things about which we are constantly thinking 
and talking, Matter, Mind, Body, Soul, Spirit, and 
Deity. 

11. Though it is well to be convinced of the depth of 
our ignorance, and to be on our guard against the fal- 
lacy of assimilating the world without to the world within, 
or of taking the one as the counterpart of the other ; yet, 

1 Treatise of Human Nature. Book I., Part I., Sect. 2. 



OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 57 

we must not so abuse the doctrine of ignorance as to 
infer that nothing can be known, or, at most, nothing 
beyond what we feel and perceive through the Senses, 
and generalizations from them; falling thus into uni- 
versal, or, at least, a modified Scepticism, which degrades 
human nature by lowering Eeason, and denying its hea- 
venly birth. Thus is man brought down to grovel in 
the dust, to limit his view to the present scene, and con- 
tent himself, like the brutes, with sensual delights. 

12. Are there then no simple intuitive truths cogniz- 
able by Keason, except those which relate to the pheno- 
mena of our own minds in general, or to abstract notions 
of quantity in particular ? Can we determine nothing 
as to the origin of ourselves and all around us ? whence 
we come, whither we are going, wherefore we are here ? 
These are the three momentous questions which embrace 
all that most concerns us. It is clear that unless we have 
some simple intuitions with respect to these questions, we 
can learn nothing about them by reasoning ; for reason- 
ing must have premises, must have a starting point 
whence it may press on to the goal. Still less, if pos- 
sible, can we know about them by experience ; for they 
are clearly beyond its reach; and besides, experience 
without a mind prepared to draw inferences from it is 
of no avail. Now, inferences from experience must be 
drawn either instinctively or rationally, and as the above 
questions evidently cannot be solved by Instinct, they 
must be solved, if at all, by Eeason, and if by Eeason, 
then there must be simple Intuitions from which Eeason 
may start. 

13. The first question relates to the origin of ourselves 



58 



KEASON. 



and others, and of all around us, animate and inanimate. 
Can we give any answer to this question ; can we deter- 
mine any thing concerning it, with probability at least, if 
not with certainty ? Or, must we give it up as insol- 
uble, and limit our view to the present scene? That 
man will never acquiesce in this utter ignorance of the 
past and the future is almost certain, for he never has so 
acquiesced hitherto, in any state of society with which 
we have become acquainted ; but whether savage or 
civilized, learned or unlearned, he has never entirely se- 
parated his present from his past and his future. To 
sceptical philosophers alone has been reserved the at- 
tempt to induce him to limit his view to what he sees ; 
but an attempt so opposed to human nature is not likely 
ever to be very successful. 

14. What view then, if any, does Intuitive Keason 
open up to us with respect to the origin of ourselves and 
all things around us ? 

Here we see at once that there are but two alterna- 
tives ; .either the course of nature, such as we observe it, 
has gone on from eternity, or it has not ; either it had 
not, or it had a beginning. Now, to affirm that the 
course of nature has gone on much as at present from all 
eternity, is at once to confess that we can assert or even 
conjecture nothing about its origin, that as far as we can 
see, it had none. We proclaim our ignorance, and pro- 
nounce it incurable. But the mind will not rest in 
this ignorance ; it will entertain suggestions and form 
theories as to the origin of things, and thereby it ever- 
lastingly confesses that they had an origin. This, then, 



OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 59 

is the first truth of Intuitive Keason, that ourselves and 
all without and around us arose from something. 

15. But what is that something? It must either 
have existed from all eternity, or have arisen from some- 
thing else, and so on for ever without any beginning. 
But the supposition of an endless chain, of a perpetual 
cycle, is one, as we have already seen, in which the 
mind cannot rest, which it never seriously entertains, 
which it can barely comprehend, and never can believe. 
Therefore it must believe that something has existed 
from all eternity. Observe we do not say that it is ab- 
solutely certain, like a proposition in geometry, that 
something has existed from all eternity, but only that 
we cannot help believing it. The truth is intuitive, 
but not strictly self-evident. The contrary involves no 
manifest contradiction. 

16. Something, then, exists from all eternity. But 
here an objection presents itself. If, after all, we are 
obliged to allow that something has existed from all 
eternity, why may not that something be the world as it 
now is ? What do we gain by maintaining that some- 
thing different from the world has so existed ? Do we 
not then merely remove the difficulty one step ? And 
what can our limited Eeason do but remove difficulties 
one step? Gravitation, or the tendency of matter to 
matter, may be the cause which keeps the earth together, 
and maintains the planets in their orbits, but what is 
the cause of gravitation ? Here we are stopped short. 
So it is in all our speculations about things existing ; we 
never can go far. But what then ? Are we to do no- 
thing because we cannot do all ? Are we to be content 



60 REASON. 

with our ignorance because we never can be all-know- 
ing ? Are we never to advance because there will 
always be something beyond which we may not reach ? 
Do what we will, ultimate causes will be involved in 
mystery; but proximate causes are within our ken. 
That our present difficulty is removed but one step by 
the belief in the eternal existence of something distinct 
from the world around, is then no valid objection, but 
an imperfection common to all our researches. Simple 
Intuition requires no reasoning to arrive at this result ; 
but reasoning may be afterwards employed, as here, to 
remove objections. In addition to the above, we may re- 
mark that the researches of modern geology have proved 
that the course of nature as it now is, has not gone on 
from all eternity, that very great changes, changes which 
we now would consider miraculous, have taken place ; 
that there was a time when man did not exist upon the 
earth, when quadrupeds did not exist, when birds did 
not exist, when there was nothing but reptiles or amphi- 
bious animals, or mollusca, and even no animal life; and 
consequently there seem to have been successive acts of 
creative power, proving a Creator distinct from the crea- 
tion. 

17. Finally, then, something exists from all eternity. 
But of what nature is that something ? To answer this 
we have only to consider what we are ourselves. We 
are not mere creatures extended, and solid or impene- 
trable, but we are feeling and thinking beings, endowed 
with sensation, emotion, and thought ; things totally 
different from what we call matter, nay, directly opposed 
to whatsoever bears that name, inasmuch as they are 



OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 61 

neither extended, solid, moveable, divisible, nor limited 
to space. They exist not in space, but in time ; whereas 
all material objects exist both in space and in time. 
Now can we believe, can we even for a moment seriously 
entertain the supposition, that what feels not, thinks not, 
foresees not, contrives not, may have formed a man? 
Is not this in reality to suppose that what thinks not 
may think, what foresees not may foresee, what contrives 
not may contrive ? and if this be not a contradiction, 
what is? 1 

18. To maintain, as has been maintained, that a man 
may have been formed by a fortuitous concourse of atoms 
moving from all eternity, is almost too absurd to deserve 
notice ; but let us entertain the supposition for a moment 
in order to see to what it amounts. In the first place it 
sets up a mere possibility, allowing it to be a possibility, 
against the very strong probability, to say the least, that 
a thinking intelligent being can have proceeded from one 
of like nature only. Secondly, even allowing the possi- 
bility that, in countless ages of time, one man may have 
been so created, in spite of hundreds of millions of 
chances to the contrary, yet how do you account for the 
existence of the race of mankind, of millions of human 
beings, past and present, and probably to come, and of 
the races of animals of all kinds now upon the face of 
the earth, or buried beneath its surface ? Is each in- 
dividual of those races supposed to have sprung from 
a fortuitous concourse of atoms ? Thus the hundreds 

1 " He that planted the ear shall he not hear ? he that formed the 
eye shall he not see?" he that made the thoughtful mind, shall he not 
think.— Psalm xciv. 9. 



62 KEASOK. 

of millions of chances are encreased to hundreds of mil- 
ions of quintillions to the contrary. 

19. We see then, intuitively, and all reasoning con- 
firms the simple intuition, not only that something has 
existed from all eternity, but something that thinks, 
foresees, contrives, an intelligent Being, in short, similar 
to ourselves as possessing intellect, how superior soever 
in degree, in a word, that there is a God. 

20. Let us rest for a moment on this sublime truth. 
Though it requires a cultivated mind to rise to the con- 
ception of One Almighty Being, Maker of the Earth, the 
Heavens, and all that therein is, yet the notion of some 
Being or Beings similar though superior to man in in- 
telligence and power, has existed among all men in all 
stages of civilization. And how ennobling is such a 
thought ! ennobling, as proving the power of the human 
mind which can soar beyond this present scene, and 
as showing that man is made in the image of God, " a 
little lower than the angels, and crowned with glory and 
honour :" and how consoling ! if our Maker be also our 
governor and protector. Could any thing that this 
world might bestow make amends for disbelief or scep- 
ticism on this fundamental point ? Could riches, and 
power, and fame, and knowledge ; could health of body 
and activity of mind, fill up the cheerless blank of 
Atheism ! Those who deny that man can find out God, 
not only deprive him of a deep source of consolation, and 
so directly diminish his happiness, but they rob him of 
a magnificent conception, a sublime object of thought, 
and degrade his Keason by limiting it to the visible, 
the tangible, and the perishable. " I had rather/' says 



OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 63 

Bacon, " believe all the fables of the Legend, and the 
Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this universal frame 
is without a Mind. And therefore God never wrought 
a miracle to convince atheism, because his ordinary works 
convince it/' — " They that deny God destroy man s nobi- 
lity ; for certainly man is of kin to the beasts by his body ; 
and if he be not of kin to God by his spirit, he is a base 
and ignoble creature : It destroys, likewise, magnanim- 
ity, and the raising human nature ; for, tako an example 
of a dog, and mark what a generosity and courage he 
will put on when he finds himself maintained by a man, 
who to him is instead of a God, or melior natura, which 
courage is manifestly such, as that creature without the 
confidence of a better nature than his own, could never 
attain to. Man when he resteth and assureth himself 
upon divine protection and favour, gathereth a force and 
faith which humane nature in itself could not attain. 1 " 

21. The first argument of the ancient atheists against 
the being of a God was, that we have no Idea of Him, 
and therefore can have no evidence of his existence ; an 
argument similar to that whereby Hume exploded Space, 
Time, Substance, Mind, and Body. Now an argument 
which, pushed to its legitimate consequences, goes so far, 
has no peculiar force against Theism. If Atheism en- 
tail universal scepticism, it is already half refuted. But 
is it true that we have no idea, no conception of God, 
or of those things just mentioned? The reason why 
Hume denied that we have no idea of Time, Space, 
Mind, and Body, etc., was that we have no impression 
of them ; but he ought rather to have concluded, as we 

1 Essays; Of Atheism. 



64 REASON. 

have ideas of these, his theory, which requires an im- 
pression for every idea, was false. Can any one sup- 
pose that we can be continually thinking and talking of 
things, talking so as to be understood by every one, 
without having any conception of what we are saying ? 
When the words, Body, Spirit, and God, occur in con- 
versation or in writing, are we obliged to stop at every 
moment to ask what they mean, or can no one inform 
us? The supposition is a contradiction, it takes for 
granted that we can understand and not understand at the 
same time. We have then conceptions of those things, 
imperfect no doubt, but sufficient for reasonable dis- 
course ; and therefore this atheistical argument falls to 
the ground by our denial of the premises. 

22. The other arguments of the atheists of old all 
depend upon the confounding of Mind with Body, and 
upon the denial of the former, except as a modification of 
the latter. This is the perpetual assumption. But the 
system of Materialism had four varieties. 

Thus there were : — 

(1.) The Atomic or Democritical System of Materi- 
alism and Atheism. 

(2.) The Hylopathic 1 or Anaximandrian. 

(3.) The Hylozoic 2, proper, or Stratonical. 

(4.) The Cosmo-plastic 3 or Stoical. 

Of these four, the first or Atomic System, called also 
Democritical from its founder, was purely material, it 
admitted of nothing but Matter, moved by blind chance^ 
and supposed life and every thing beside vhrj Slttoios, 

1 From vXvjj matter, and «ra0«s, affection. 2 From tfow, and ?«>?, life. 
3 From xoo-pos, order, and tf-Xaov*/, to form. 



OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 65 

bare matter or resisting bulk, to be merely accidental, 
perishable, and corruptible. 

The second system, the Hylopathic or Anaximandrian, 
so far modified the above as to admit of the incorrup- 
tible existence of certain affections in matter, and thus 
departed a little from pure materialism. 

The third system, the Hylozoic proper or Stratonical, 
and the fourth, the Cosmo-plastic or Stoical, agreed in 
introducing a principle of Life and Order into matter, 
and made that principle to be ingenerable and incor- 
ruptible, thus departing further from materialism pure ; 
but the Stoics, in this respect, went beyond the followers 
of Strato, Thus, these four systems rise gradually from 
materialism pure to a doctrine approximating to im- 
rnaterialism. 1 

23. Since all we know of Matter as well as of Mind is 
their qualities, and as the qualities of Mind, Sensation, 
Emotion, and Thought, are totally different from those 
of Matter, Extension, Solidity, Mobility in Space, and 

1 Leucippus, Democritus, Protagoras, were the three most ancient 
atheists, of whom the first lived before the time of Plato, the two others 
about that time. Epicurus came long after. Democritus was a pupil 
of Leucippus, and Protagoras a pupil of Democritus, and all were of 
Abdera. On the ancient systems of Atheism, at large, see Cudworth's 
Intellectual System, Chap. III. 

It is curious and instructive to see how often old and exploded errors 
are reproduced. Could it have been believed that the Hylozoic or the ' 
Cosmo-plastic system of Atheism, one or the other, should be promul- 
gated anew in our day, under the significant phrase of the self-evolving 
powers of nature ? Nay, that a clergyman of the Church of England 
should endorse the bill ! See Oxford Essays and Reviews, 1860. Es- 
say 3. In the same place, we are told that either development or 
spontaneous generation must be true. Would Democritus himself have 
spoken otherwise ? 



66 REASON. 

Divisibility, how absurd is it to give the same name to 
things having qualities not only dissimilar, but actually 
opposed ! But this absurdity belongs to all systems of 
Materialism, and hence to all systems of Atheism founded 
on Materialism. Those who, to avoid the introduction 
of Mind, gave Life and Order to Matter, and made it 
ingenerable and incorruptible, created something of their 
own, something widely different from the common con- 
ception of Matter, a heterogeneous compound of Mind 
and Matter, a union of contradictory elements. 

24. There is probably no variety of modern Atheism 
which had not its prototype in antiquity. Thus the 
recent theory of gradual development, as it is called, 
whereby Matter is supposed of itself to have gradually 
assumed new forms, from the most simple state of animal 
being up to the most complicated, bears a strong resem- 
blance to the Cosmoplastic or Stoical system of Life and 
Order inherent in Matter. But this theory is not only 
liable to the unanswerable objections common to all sys- 
tems of Materialism, but it is opposed to all we know 
of animal life, actual and extinct. It is confidently af- 
firmed by the greatest zoologist that ever lived, the in- 
defatigable Cuvier, that there is not the slightest ground 
to believe that, since the beginning of authentic history, 
a single instance can be produced of the conversion of 
one species into another. The researches of geologists 
lead to the same conclusion. The species of fossil ani- 
mals seem to have been as distinct as those that now 
exist ; and if the same species sometimes, though rarely, 
occur in different formations, new ones also appear, dif- 
fering widely from those of more ancient date. Thus 



OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 67 

the theory of gradual development is refuted by facts ; 
and we are irresistibly led to believe in successive crea- 
tions of animals, and hence in successive exertions of 
Creative Power. Geology has amazingly increased the 
field of our knowledge ; it lifts us out of the present 
scene, and places us beside the wonders of an infinite 
past ; it shows us that before the earth and its inhabi- 
tants existed, as they exist now, many changes occurred 
which we would term miraculous ; and thus it forces upon 
us a Creative Mind, and refutes the argument against 
miracles drawn from the invariable course of nature. 

25. When a system has become thoroughly discredited, 
antiquated, and obsolete, it may sometimes be revived 
with advantage by giving it a new name. Thus the 
doctrine of Materialism, as old as Democritus, reappears 
in our days under the title of Positive Philosophy. The 
name is well-chosen in this respect that it tells nothing, 
and so rouses curiosity, and leads us to expect novelty. 
But what is positive philosophy ? The positive philo- 
sopher professes to cling to the visible and the tangible 
and the material, and to reject all besides. He al- 
lows the uniform course of Nature, and says that we 
can trace the invariable sequences of phenomena ; but he 
denies Causation ; for Causation is a relation, and a re- 
lation is not material. And if he admit not Causation 
in things finite, of course he rejects a Cause infinite. 
Yet he does not boldly assert with Democritus that the 
world and all that therein is, animate and inanimate, 
arose from a fortuitous concourse of atoms ; for that 
would be too dogmatic ; but he maintains that the sub- 
ject is quite beyond our ken, that we never can know 



68 REASON. 

anything about our origin, and therefore we ought not 
to waste one thought thereon. Psychology, the Science 
of Mind, he treats with great contempt, except as a 
branch of Physiology ; and Emotion and Thought are 
with him mere bodily phenomena. Still, he does not 
deny the existence of intelligent finite beings, other 
than himself, though in this he seems inconsistent, for 
how do these become known to him ? Does he not see 
them ? does he not feel them ? it will be answered. 
He certainly may see and feel their bodies ; but can he 
see or feel their intelligence ? Assuredly not. There- 
fore, in reality, he has, according to his own system, no 
more proof of the existence of finite intellectual beings, 
than he has of an infinite spirit. From the phenomena 
of his own mind, and certain bodily appearances in those 
around him, he infers the existence of Intellect in other 
men, as from the phenomena of our own minds, and 
from the instances of design in the material world, we 
infer the existence of a Being of Intelligence supreme. 
The positive philosopher, to be consistent, ought to deny 
both God and Man ; for our senses alone reaveal to us 
neither. To this it may be replied, that it is not from 
bodily appearances only that we infer the existence of 
other intelligent beings, but from their speech, their 
rational discourse. True, from rational discourse we 
infer a rational being; but from written discourse, with- 
out the presence of a person in bodily shape, we should 
draw the same inference ; and is not design, is not con- 
sistency, is not wisdom, as distinctly marked by the 
works of nature, as by the writings of men ? 

26. That God is not present to us in a bodily shape, 



OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 69 

tells nothing. Were I to fall in with a complicated 
structure, such as I had never seen made, such as I had 
never beheld before, but in which I could detect a plan, 
and various contrivances all tending towards the carry- 
ing out of that plan, I should as certainly conclude that 
Man or some other intelligent being was its author, as 
if I had witnessed him at work. To this, perhaps, it- 
may be objected, how can I tell what is plan or contriv- 
ance, if I have never been witness to the carrying it out? 
Must I not have had experience of some such work going 
on under my eyes before I can say that any purpose was 
really meant ? To this I answer that the mere sight of 
a man at work does not prove design ; he may be only 
amusing himself, and exercising his body without any 
definite end, like workmen in Ireland during the famine, 
who were employed to remove heaps of earth from one 
place to another, merely to keep them doing something. 
It is not then because I see a man at work that I detect 
design in what he is doing, but it is because I, with 
the eye of Eeason, detect design in any thing, that I 
infer that Man, or some other intellectual Being, has 
been there. The discovery of design is thus, in the first 
instance, truly Intuitive, though, no doubt, early intuit 
tion may be cultivated and improved by a close atten- 
tion to the structure of a machine, of a plant, of an 
animal; but, without a previous mental susceptibility, 
such study would be fruitless. We might have a 
thorough knowledge of all the parts of an animal, as 
mere anatomists we might be perfect ; merely by the 
use of our senses, by our perceptions, and by manual 
dexterity ; but by Reason alone can we determine Func- 



70 REASON. 

tion ; and if there be no intuitive Eeason, there can be 
none whatsoever. 

27. Design necessarily supposes a designer. From 
this there is no escape ; for the one without the other 
is a contradiction. He then who allows design must, 
in logic, allow an intelligent author of that design, be he 
Man, Angel, or God. Therefore every physiologist who 
shows the uses of any part of the body, the purpose it 
serves, by the very employment of the ^oxA. purpose im- 
plicitly confesses Deity. 

28. Thus we arrive at the grand conclusion, that the 
Being of a God is one of the earliest truths of Intuitive 
Eeason ; derived, first, from the thought that I exist,, 
therefore something has existed from all eternity; se- 
condly, from the thought that I am an intelligent being, 
therefore something Intelligent has existed from all eter- 
nity ; thirdly, from the intuition of design in myself and 
in all nature, as necessarily implying a Designer. It is 
not pretended that all these propositions are in general 
clearly comprehended, much less that they are formally 
stated in words ; but that in some form or other they do 
unavoidably arise in the human mind, mixed up perhaps 
with many whimsies, but leading irresistibly, without 
conscious effort, to the one grand belief, belief in an 
Intelligent Being superior in wisdom and power to man. 
It is the business of the metaphysician to bring to light 
the latent processes of thought, and state them openly 
and clearly ; and if these be true to nature each mind 
will respond to their accuracy. 

29. Let us rejoice then in the reflection that the being 
of a God rests on the first principles of human Eeason ; 



OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 71 

that so long as that Eeason exists it must acknowledge a 
great Creator ; that all the ingenuity of atheists, all the 
sneers of scoffers, can never materially shake this deep 
conviction ; nay, that all the absurdities of Paganism, 
all the intolerance of Islamism, all the atrocities com- 
mitted in the name of Eeligiori, while they show the 
weakness of man, bear testimony to his belief in a God. 
It is this sublime belief, the glory and the consolation of 
man in all ages, the glory of his intellect, the consolation 
of his soul, which lifts our minds from earth and enables 
them to soar to heaven, fills the thoughts, warms the 
emotions, opens up a scene beyond this life, and glad- 
dens and dignifies the present by hopes of the future. 

30. In the beginning of the present century, there 
arose in England a sect, which, in the genius and self- 
confidence of its founder, in the talents and the almost 
fanatical zeal of his followers, in rigidity of system, con- 
sistency of views, and fearless adoption of logical conse- 
quences, resembles more one of the philosophical sects 
of antiquity than any that has sprung up in modern 
times. The first blast which called this sect into being 
sounded forth from Crichoff in White Eussia, whence, in 
the month of January 1787, Bentham uplifted his voice 
against the usury laws and law taxes. The French 
Eevolution was then just beginning; and no doubt 
the young English philosopher had drunk deeply of 
those intoxicating draughts which soon turned the 
heads of a whole nation. Indeed, the whole of his sys- 
tem is deeply impregnated with the then prevailing 
philosophy of France. This he transported to English 
ground, supported by all the powers of his acute mind, 



72 REASON. 

and added enough of his own to make him the Idol of a 
large and highly-gifted circle. Like Socrates, he is bet- 
ter known through the writings of his followers than by 
his own ; for his early and best works were never finished 
by himself, and appeared only in a foreign dress, edited 
from rough materials, and translated into French, by Du- 
mont, a citizen of Geneva. His own style, at first pure 
and simple, became afterwards almost unreadable, full 
of long parentheses, one within another, and stuffed with 
words of his own coining. Partly, then, from his own 
writings, but more from those of his followers, as well as 
from oral communication, we arrive at a knowledge of 
his system. 

31. The avowed end and object of the whole was the 
greatest possible happiness of the greatest number, and 
the rule whereby to estimate any thing was Utility. 
The spring of all human actions was Self-interest, and 
consequently on the proper direction of this grand mov- 
ing power, all good, all happiness, social and individual, 
must depend. Such was the end, such the rule, such 
the active principle of the system. It was a system of 
universal philanthrophy, founded on a total disbelief in 
benevolence, or, at least, a total omission of that element 
in all calculations ; and it was a system of human enjoy- 
ment, based on a rejection of many things, in which men, 
blindly perhaps, but obstinately, persist in placing their 
happiness. Thus, to limit our thoughts to the scene 
before us was the only way to arrive at the perfection of 
human society on earth, and to deprive men of all hope 
in the future was the best expedient for delight in the 
present. The aphorism of a French philosopher was thus 



OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 73 

adopted and inculcated: "les idees d'un autre monde 
font a celui-ci plus de tort qu on ne pense." 1 Keligion, 
accordingly, made no part of the system, neither natural 
nor revealed. I have by me at this time a publication 
by one of the sect showing the baneful influence of na- 
tural Eeligion on the temporal happiness of mankind ; 
and by natural religion was meant all religion. 

32. But God, religion, and all the hopes and consola- 
tions of religion, though the greatest, were not the only 
sacrifices which men were called upon to make to secure 
their temporal felicity. Art, elegant literature, especi- 
ally poetry, were to be offered up on the altar of a mer- 
ciless utility. According to Bentham, poetry was a 
noxious production, and the Iliad should have been 
thrown into the fire. In ethics, the sect were lenient 
towards sexual immoralities, partly because they were 
pleasureable, partly because they tended to discourage 
marriage, and so to check population. Outward actions, 
more than the disposition, were the proper object of the 
moralist ; a principle diametrically opposed to that of 
the gospel. In politics, the opinions of the sect were 
democratical in the extreme, and rigidly systematic, re- 
sembling in this respect the principles of the French 
revolutionary legislators, despising all compromise, all 
attention to the particular circumstances of different 
countries. Thus the chief himself wrote a Project of a 
Constitutional Code for any country. His genius bore 
a strong likeness to that of the systematic Sieyes, the 
principal author of the uniform division of France into 
Departments, who thought to make Napoleon the well 

1 Say : Petit volume. 



74 KEASON. 

paid but powerless head of his grand Constitution. 1 In 
metaphysics, the sect were sensationalists, holding the 
material doctrines of Condillac in all their purity ; that 
thought, intellect, reason, are only transformed sensa- 
tions ; that the Mind is a mere recipient of impressions, 
adding little or nothing to what comes from without ; 
that it is nearly akin to matter, and perishes with the 
body. That many really benevolent, many superior men 
belonged to the sect, cannot be disputed ; but a system 
must be judged by itself, not by the character of its sup- 
porters, much less of a few of them ; and that system 
(as we have seen) was Epicurean, hostile to literature 
as opposed to science, materialist in the utmost de- 
gree, and irreligious. Such a system could scarcely 
have appeared but in a country like England, where the 
low doctrines of the French philosophers, combining with 
the matter of fact character of the people, produced a 
compound wherein real deformity and repulsiveness were 
concealed by no drapery, embellished by no graces, raised 
by no sentiment. Sentiment was laughed at, ornament 
abjured, grace unknown ; but an iron, unbending, yet 
narrow utility, guided by a pitiless logic, was henceforth 
to mould the world. 

33. Some of this sect were excellent logicians, and 
logic was to be followed at any price ; but logic teaches 
consistency only, not truth, and if the premises be erro- 
neous, or equivocal, or true only with limitations not stated 
and taken into account, the inferences may be all correct, 
the system harmonious and perfect in all its parts, and 

1 In Napoleon's own emphatic words, " un cochon a l'engrais de 
quelques millions." 



OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 75 

yet the conclusions may diverge widely from the truth. 
One other characteristic of the Benthamic sect remains 
then to be stated, it was a sect of Rationalists, a name 
from its etymology too complimentary, but the import of 
which is thus given by Bacon : a Bationale enim genus 
philosophantium ex experientia arripiunt varia et vul- 
garia, eaque neque certo comperta, nee diligenter exam- 
inata et pensitata ; reliqua in meditatione atque .ingenii 
agitatione ponunt." This kind of false philosophy he 
also calls Sophistica} Thus from the single principle 
of Self-interest, understood in the grossest sense, and in 
this sense not true to nature, the Benthamites deduced 
all their conelusions in Morals, Politics, and Legislation. 
The same species of false philosophy is again characterised 
in the De Augmentis Scientiarum : — "Alius error fluit 
ex nimia reverentia, et quasi adoratione intellectus hu- 
mani, unde homines abduxere se a contemplatione 
naturae, atque ab experientia, in propriis meditationibus 
et ingenii commentis susque deque volutantes. Coeterum 
praeclaros hos opinatores, et (si ita loqui licet) Intellec- 
tualistas, qui tamen pro maxime sublimibus et divinis 
philosophis haberi solent, recte Heraclitus perstrinxit. 
Homines, inquit, qucerunt veritatem in Microcosmis suis, 
non in mundo majori. 2 

34. Among the Idola Tribus, or the source of errors 
common to the whole human race, we must include the 
tendency to be too much taken up with the material, the 
tangible, the visible, and too little with the immaterial, 
the intangible, the invisible. From this source springs 
Materialism and Atheism. That it is an Idol is clear, 

1 Novum Organum, Aph. LXII. 2 Liber I. 



76 EEASON. 

for the spiritual world, as we have seen, is at least as 
certain as the material, nay more so, and without doubt 
the most important. In fact, the material world is to 
us of consequence only as it affects our spiritual being. 
There is something, unquestionably, in the permanence 
of the qualities of matter, as opposed to the fleeting phe- 
nomena of mind, which suggests the idea of the reality 
of the former, the absence thereof in the latter ; but this 
is a mere delusion, for the Mind remains, though the 
phenomena change ; and while they last, these pheno- 
mena are as truly real, as positive if you will, as any 
thing can be. In strictness, the only thing of which we 
cannot doubt is the present phenomenon of our mind, 
whatever that may be ; on every thing else we may be 
sceptical without contradiction, but on this we cannot. 
Therefore the immaterial is beyond controversy, the 
material not; and consequently, it is unreasonable to 
believe in the latter more strongly than in the former, a 
mistake to be more occupied about it, an unpardonable 
blunder to confound the one with the other, and the 
climax of error to admit the material alone. 

35. When the special occupation favours the general 
tendency, then the effect is seen in all its intensity. Such 
is the case with anatomists and medical men, who in the 
exercise of their calling are constantly employed in ex- 
amining or in treating the body. That nothing more 
forcibly proves the existence of design and a Great 
Designer than the structure of the human body, is beyond 
doubt; yet so bad was the religious character of the 
medical profession, that ifc became an adage, ubi tres 
rnedici ibi duo Athei. Here we see the above tendency 



OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 77 

in all its power. In spite of contrivances, so numerous, 
so complicated, so beneficial, so evident, that Keason 
must acknowledge them, and their bounteous Author, 
the universal tendency to be too much taken up with 
matter, added to the custom, peculiar to anatomists and 
physicians, of attending specially to the body, are more 
powerful than Keason. Thus materialism and irreligion 
are engendered, the strongest evidence to the contrary 
notwithstanding. For what evidence could we imagine 
stronger than the evidence of design, and hence of a 
designing mind, afforded by the human body ? Were 
Grod to appear in a personal shape, the proof of his exist- 
ence would be no greater. What work could we sup- 
pose Him to perform that would more plainly indicate 
his Intelligence and Power? Unless he were always 
present to our senses, Sceptics might doubt, and positive 
philosophers would deny, that he ever had really appeared, 
as they now doubt and deny the Kesurrection of Jesus 
Christ. Some would say that it was a phantom, like the 
Docetes of old, a delusion, or a fraud, or might turn a 
deaf ear to the proper evidence, maintaining that all mir- 
acles were incredible. Nothing of this sort can be said 
against the evidence of a designing mind in the human 
body, and in the innumerable other beings around us, 
and truly may it be affirmed that he who is not convinced 
by these would not be persuaded though one rose from 
the dead. 

36. Thus it appears that Materialism, or under its 
new name, positive Philosophy, is nothing more than a 
notable exhibition of an Idol common to the whole human 
race, propped up, in certain occupations especially, by the 



78 KEASON. 

power of constant Custom. These lower principles of 
our nature are continually at war with Reason, and some- 
times quite overcome it. They impair the faith of all ; 
or almost all, in the invisible world, whatever Keason 
and Kevelation may suggest to the contrary; but in 
the Materialist and Atheist they obtain a complete 
victory. 

37. It is a maxim of Bacon that Nature is best seen 
in extremes. Thus the extreme case of anatomists and 
medical men shows what a tendency to materialism there 
is in human nature ; and how readily it can be increased 
even in the face of the strongest possible evidence to the 
contrary. We may be sure then that the same tendency 
exists, though in a less degree, in other and ordinary 
cases. The influence of anatomy on the mind was well 
understood by the late Dr Arnold, who therefore con- 
sidered it a very dangerous study. Anatomy a dangerous 
study ! which, to use an anatomical phrase, demonstrates 
the being of a God. Yet he was right, for Custom soon 
deadens our sensibility to the wonders of design before 
us, which at first exercise Keason and rouse Emotion ; 
while the same custom more and more impresses matter 
on our senses. It is a combat between the higher and 
the lower principles of our nature, wherein, so long as 
novelty exists, the advantage is in favour of the former, 
but as that wears off, the latter obtain the ascendancy. 
And this result is facilitated by the natural tendency of 
all men towards materialism. We deem it extremely 
important to keep this tendency in view, for it shows us 
the origin of many false systems, and warns us against 
what we ought to struggle. To dethrone this Idol, is the 



OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 79 

grand object of a pure and spiritual religion, the religion 
of the G-ospel, which contains the noblest philosophy, 
the philosophy of Mind as opposed to the philosophy of 
Matter. 

38. While the Belief, and hence the Philosophy of 
man tends so readily to materialism, his feelings and his 
sentiments often show his better nature. Thus the more 
man advances in civilization, the more is the material 
kept out of sight, covered with a veil, and surrounded 
with a multitude of adventitious circumstances to mask 
the gross reality. All the pomp of the world is paraded 
before our eyes to blind them to what lies behind the 
scenes ; and nobody must even hint at what every body 
knows. The pleasures of sense may be mentioned, only 
if moderate, and in any case they must be briefly dis- 
missed. To talk much even of eating and drinking is 
thought bad manners, and to eat voraciously is disgust- 
ing. Drinking is more tolerated because it is not a mere 
pleasure of sense. There are I believe a few philoso- 
phers, and I hope but a few, who consider this natural 
modesty as a prejudice, for, according to them, one 
kind of pleasure is as good as another ; but the feeling 
is deeply seated in human nature ; it exists even in sav- 
ages, but much more in civilized life ; and it proves that 
man, though he cannot forget his body, is ashamed of 
its wants and its enjoyments, for he knows of something 
higher. Why this shame, if the body be not felt to de- 
grade the mind ? 

39. We have said that the more a people advances 
in civilization, the more the wants of the body are con- 
cealed. It is this which constitutes refinement, and refine- 



80 REASON. 

ment is the very soul of civilization. Many, very many ele- 
ments, no doubt, enter into the complex idea of civilization ; 
but the principal element is a modesty and delicacy about 
the body and its wants, in a word, refinement. One 
people may be inferior to another in wealth and political 
importance, even in science, literature, and general acute- 
ness, but if they be more refined, they will still be at the 
head of civilization. Such is the case with Great Britain. 
Though in many respects France and other continental 
nations may equal or surpass us, yet in refinement we 
are before them all, and on this account we stand the 
first of the civilized world. We cannot walk through 
Paris or any other large continental city, we cannot 
travel along a foreign railway, without being struck with 
the want of refinement to which we are accustomed at 
home. It may seem to some that in England this is 
carried to an excess, but fastidiousness is better than 
grossness. You are invited to a dinner where every lux- 
ury is placed before you, but you must seem to care for 
nothing. You may eat what is offered you, but sparingly, 
and slowly, without avidity ; you must by no means 
praise any thing and say how good, and you must not 
even ask to be helped twice to the same dish, for you 
would seem to like it too well. In short, whatever your 
appetite, whatever you relish, you must show the utmost 
indifference to every delicacy, if you would not transgress 
the laws of refined society. There may be some excess 
in all this, and foreigners feel it irksome, but it is a good 
excess, it is a triumph of mind over matter. 

40. Nothing shows more clearly the progress of refine- 
ment in England, and our superiority over the nations of 



OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 81 

the continent, than our literature. The drama of the 
present day is certainly very inferior in general talent, 
especially in wit, to the plays of Congreve, Farquhar, 
Vanbrugh, Wycherly, and Cibber ; but these, in spite 
of their brilliancy, are now unreadable in company, and 
cannot be acted. The same may be said of not a little of 
Shakspeare, and all the dramatists of his time. Modern 
English novels may be read even by young ladies with- 
out a blush, but would you put Tom Jones, or Joseph 
Andrews, or Amelia into their hands ? Yet these were, 
and in talent still are, the first of English novels. And 
compare our present novels with those of France, the 
writings of Bulwer with those of Eugene Sue, Pelham 
with the My steres de Paris, In talent, in brilliancy, 
we must yield to the novelists of France ; but in morality, 
in refinement, we surely may bear the palm. Eefine- 
ment itself is highly moral ; it is an homage paid to mind 
by mind. 

41. Keligion, which raises our minds above the fogs 
of sense, and fixes them on the brightness of the invisible 
world, is, and must be, the greatest source of refinement. 
Those who have mixed with the lower ranks of life are 
aware that persons of the most humble station, deeply 
imbued with religious belief, are refined to a degree far 
above the ordinary standard to which they belong. What 
a triumph of Eeligion is here, which, amidst pressing 
bodily wants and privations, can purify and refine the 
mind and raise it above matter ! 

42. The principal active powers of nature are hidden 
from our view ; so that if we disbelieve in the invisible, 
the intangible, and the inaudible, we must disbelieve 



82 REASON. 

those powers also. The needle turns to the pole, but 
who can see, touch ; or hear the magnetic fluid? The 
telegraphic wire carries our messages with the rapidity 
of lightning, but who can perceive the galvanic current ? 
Heat the effect is sensible, but the cause Caloric is con- 
cealed. These agents cannot be detected even by the 
most delicate balance, and hence they have been called 
imponderable ; and we are called upon to believe in mat- 
ter without weight, at least without sensible weight. 
And every philosopher does believe in them, though he 
knows not what they are in themselves, whether a pecu- 
liar sort of matter, or a modification of ordinary matter. 
But, if we are to disbelieve in God because we cannot see, 
touch, or hear him, then ought we to disbelieve also in 
those imponderable agents, and Eeligion and Philosophy 
must fall together. 

43. We have shown that Materialism in all its varieties 
is nothing more than an exhibition of a grand idol of the 
human mind, the tendency to be too much struck with 
objects of sense, and too little with those of reason. This 
tendency is shown in every thing. Hence, for instance, 
the belief, almost universal, that changes of weather de- 
pend upon certain changes of the moon, upon the new, the 
full, the quarter-moon, though there is no more reason 
for the belief than for the superstition once attached to 
eclipses, a superstition which cost the Athenians their 
whole force in Sicily. A rather remarkable change of 
weather having occurred about the time of the last great 
eclipse of the sun, (March 15, 1858), the eclipse be- 
came the ready cause, though it scarcely 



OF SIMPLE INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 83 

"Disastrous twilight shed 
On half the nations." 

The same tendency was grossly shown in the philosophy 
of the Kentish clown, who maintained that Tenterden 
Church steeple, then newly built, was the cause of the 
Goodwin sands. In fact, the tendency is universal, the 
instances thereof are innumerable. Any thing that strikes 
the senses will do for a cause. 

44. This power of the material and the palpable over our 
mind is greatly assisted by another, the force of Custom. 
We have shown elsewhere 1 that some of the most impor- 
tant opinions of the mass of mankind are mainly owing 
not to reason but to custom ; and if such be the power 
of custom over important opinions, its influence on minor 
matters will scarcely be disputed. We believe, in short, 
that a great deal commonly attributed to reason is ow- 
ing only to custom ; and that many actions, of the lower 
animals especially, which look rational, are, in truth, only 
customary. When two things, and two phenomena 
have frequently been observed conjoined in time or in 
space, whenever we remark the one we are sure to expect 
the other. There is a tendency to this expectation even 
after one conjunction, as we have already seen ; but 
this tendency is much strengthened by repetition. Such 
is the power of custom, and by it we may explain a mul- 
titude of facts without having recourse to reason. It is 
thus that we expect that the sun will rise and set in 
future as in times past, that the seasons will succeed each 
other in their customary order, that spring and summer, 

1 See the Author's " Principles of Psychology." Part III., chap. 
VI1L, sect. 19, 20, 21, 22. 



84 REASON. 

autumn and winter, will never fail ; that no earthquakes, 
no volcanic eruptions, no deluge, no fire will destroy us ; 
and that everything will go on much as usual. So, the 
man of uninterrupted good health cannot believe that he 
shall ever be an invalid ; but when he falls ill he antici- 
pates the worst ; while he who has long been an invalid 
can scarcely believe that he shall ever die. The same 
holds true, more or less, of every man, and is no doubt 
a great cause of courage, even in imminent danger. We 
are so accustomed to life that we cannot realize death ; 
but when death does strike beside us, much more when 
the body is consigned to the tomb, we are so impressed 
by tbe blank, by the disappearance of the bodily presence, 
that our faith in the invisible world is rudely shaken, 
and melancholy contends with grief. But this doubt, 
this despondency, is not rational; it is not caused by any 
new fact, any new reasonable ground of disbelief, but sim- 
ply by the violent interruption of Custom, which produces 
an effect quite independent of Keason. The body is gone, 
and with it all appearance of life, all outward signs of 
mental existence ; our senses are no longer impressed, 
our blind belief in continuity is dispelled ; but, in all this, 
there is no reasonable ground for despondency. That 
all men die we knew very well before, and if the fact did 
not prevent faith when the king of terrors was far off, 
neither should it drive us to despair when he is close at 
hand. But the further consideration of Custom must be 
reserved for the following chapter. 



CHAPTER III. 

OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 

SECTION FIEST. 
OF SEASONING IN GENERAL. 

1. Since Simple Intuition can go but a little way. we 
are obliged to have recourse to a series of Intuitions, each 
depending upon that which went before, and thus all 
hanging together, and this is called Beasoning. There is 
thus nothing peculiarly mysterious in reasoning, nothing 
more mysterious then in the Simple Intuitions of which 
it is made up, and as simple intuition is either certain or 
probable, so is Eeasoning demonstrative or otherwise. 
There are then two distinct hinds of reasoning, generically 
the same, specifically different ; but how many varieties 
there may be of each, no one can say. This only we may 
affirm with tolerable confidence, that, although there 
must be something common to all Reasoning, or the same 
name would not have been given to the process in all 
cases, yet as there are two distinct kinds thereof, and as 



86 KEASON. 

simple intuitions are various, so must reasonings be vari- 
ous, and not reducible to one type by any legitimate exer- 
cise of ingenuity. To suppose for instance, as it has 
been supposed, and on high authority, that all reasoning 
can be reduced to the form of the Scholastic Syllogism, is 
contrary to what we should expect from the nature of the 
case j or a priori; as well as utterly at variance with 
facts, that is, with real instances of reasoning drawn from 
different sources. 1 

2. Since the mind of man is exceedingly diversified, 
fertile and ingenious in finding out relations between 
things, we must suppose that reasoning which traces those 
relations is no less diversified, and that the attempt to 
reduce all reasoning to one type is as violent, as opposed 
to nature, as that whereby the bed of Procrustes was made 
to fit all guests. Nothing is gained by this excessive sim- 
plification but a specious uniformity concealing a real di- 
versity, a starched and stiff appearance, like a man in a 
straight waistcoat. These unnatural generalizations are 
the bane of science, for they give it an air of perfection 
which it really has not, and so prevent further inquiry. 
The scholastic syllogism has acted like the swaddling 
clothes of children, within which they may exercise their 
puny limbs, but out of which they cannot escape. 

3. We have seen that Eeasoning is a substitute for 
Simple Intuition ; and if our faculties were greatly en- 
larged we might see many things at once which now we 
can find out only by a process of reasoning. When we 

1 See on this subject the Author's " Principles of Psychology," Part 
III., chap. X., section 2., where the nature and value of the Scholastic 
Syllogism are thoroughly discussed. 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 87 

have thoroughly mastered a subject, the truths become 
so familiar and so evident, that we seem to know them 
instantly by simple Intuition, though at first we may 
have been long in acquiring them. One difficulty in 
distinguishing between Simple and Complex Intuition 
or Reasoning, is the excessive rapidity of the mental 
process in many cases, and the consequent oblivion of 
the intermediate steps. Many facts prove the wonder- 
fully rapid flow of ideas in dreams ; and the difficulty of 
remembering them may be owing chiefly to this cause. 
Whatever is very transient can leave but little impres- 
sion. This difficulty of distinguishing between Simple 
Intuition and Eeasoning is a strong proof of their simi- 
larity. 

4. Where two things cannot be compared directly so 
as to determine the relation between them, we must have 
recourse to some medium, the relation of which to each 
of the things in question is either apparent or can easily 
be ascertained. Thus, if I wish to prove the respective 
heights of two trees far apart, the difference between them 
not being great, I cannot tell from sight merely which 
is the taller, but, on applying a measuring line to each, 
I learn what I want. So it is with Reasoning. The 
whole art or ingenuity of Reasoning consists in finding 
out media by which the unknown relations of things may 
be discovered ; and the whole science of reasoning con- 
sists in knowing when reasoning is valid and when not. 
The former cannot be taught by any known rules, it 
depends upon a fertility of mind, natural or acquired by 
long practice ; but the latter may be promoted by certain 
rules, especially relating to the fallacies and sophisms 



88 KEAS0N. 

into which men are apt to fall. These rules, then, teach 
us rather what to avoid than what to seek, how to shun 
sophistry rather than how to reason conclusively ; and 
so it is with all the rules of Logic, which is a practical 
science, not one of pure speculation. The knowledge of 
the process of Seasoning belongs to pure Psychology, 
the rules to avoid sophistical reasoning appertain to 
Logic. 

5. Since the object of Eeasoning is to prove one pro- 
position by means of another, it necessarily follows that 
Eeasoning must start from something not proved but 
given, some datum to lead us on to something else ; and, 
therefore, on the soundness of this datum, as well as on 
the accuracy of the reasoning, the truth of the conclusion 
will depend. Where the data are self-evident, the con- 
ceptions perfectly clear and distinct, as in pure geometry, 
the reasoning only can be in fault ; but on most subjects, 
in all where pure quantity is not concerned, the data are 
not strictly self-evident, and the conceptions not defined 
with perfect accuracy. Therefore, in all these cases, the 
premises as well as the reasoning may be wrong, and 
though the latter be without a flaw, the conclusion may 
Be unsound. Now Logic, properly so called, pure Logic, 
does not teach us how to arrive at the knowledge of pre- 
mises ; and therefore perfect dialectics may coincide with 
the grossest errour. 

6. Where pure Quantity is concerned, there is no dif- 
ficulty in finding the premises, and when found, they are, 
beyond all question, universal, without exception or 
limitation; but where Quality is introduced, there at 
once enters restriction, reservation, a want of determina- 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 89 

tion ; and hence the necessity of looking on all sides to 
see where different qualities agree or clash. Without 
this comprehensive view we produce systems beautifully 
consistent, but deceitful ; for professing to embrace all, 
they give only half the truth. Thus on the Self-interest 
of the Benthamic school was raised an edifice of perfect 
symmetry, though on a narrow basis, pleasing to behold, 
but unsafe to inhabit. It is on this account that Mental 
Philosophy, pure and mixed, affords so much better an 
exercise than Mathematics, which employ the reasoning 
faculty alone, and require no circumspection, no sugges- 
tion of the opposite sides of a question, no balancing of 
arguments for and against, no allowance for circumstan- 
ces, no limitations in the conclusions. 

7. These things being considered, we shall be disposed 
to believe that errour arises more from a deficiency in 
data than from inaccuracy in reasoning. Inconclusive rea- 
soning any one may detect, but to supply what has been 
omitted in the premises is a far more difficult task. For 
this purpose comprehensiveness of mind and impartiality 
are both required; a combination of intellectual and moral 
qualities which no rules of art can teach. It is this 
comprehensiveness of mind which peculiarly distinguishes 
Bacon, not the subtlety of his reasoning. In the latter 
he would have been no match for some of the school 
logicians. Now this comprehensiveness is not at all 
required in pure Mathematics, where the data are few 
and simple, and where none can be overlooked. The 
certainty of the conclusions depends, no doubt, upon this 
simplicity, but the same simplicity is unfavourable to 
any varied exercise of thought. 



90 REASON. 

8. Something similar may be said of pure Logic. 
Pure Logic, works in a nut-shell, but within those limits 
it works securely. It makes no account of the truth or 
falsehood of the premises ; but it determines by unerring 
rules whether the conclusions be accurately drawn or- 
not. Thus it favours acuteness but not comprehensive- 
ness, a facility for detecting errours rather than for mak- 
ing discoveries, a love of disputation and victory more 
than a love of truth. Still this is a mental exercise of 
no mean value, which sharpens though it may narrow, 
producing a pleader rather than a philosopher. Dialec- 
tics is the proper education for a lawyer, especially an 
English lawyer, who, assuming for premises the most 
whimsical fictions, bends the whole force of his mind to 
reason consistently with these. The legislator, on the 
other hand, should establish sound general principles, 
which the lawyer must receive and adopt, be they bad 
or good. The frame of mind proper to the one is, there- 
fore, but ill-suited to the other. 1 

9. As the intellectual qualities of the lawyer and those 
of the legislator are very different, so are those of the 
critic and commentator on the one hand, and of the 
independent thinker on the other. The object of the 
philosophical critic is to detect errours, — that of the 
independent thinker to strike out something new ; the 
former pores over the works of others, the latter consults 
more his own mind ; the one delights in showing that the 
supposed discoveries of the other are as old as Aristotle 

1 " Unfit with great affairs to mix 
His little nisi prius tricks." 
— See Moore's " Epitaph on a Lawyer." 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 91 

and Plato ; that is a scholar, a learned antiquarian, a 
practised logician, this cares little for authority, reads 
only to think, reasons only to discover, and propounds 
theories ingenious, original if not new, startling, perhaps 
even paradoxical. Each has his vocation, though of 
unequal dignity ; and each may degenerate, the one into 
a pedant, the other into a day-dreamer. 

10. We must never forget that although reasoning be 
one grand engine for the discovery of truth, yet it is only 
a substitute for Simple Intuition ; that there is then a 
Reason which transcends all reasoning ; nay, that there 
is an Instinct which transcends a great part of reasoning, 
being before it in time, immoveable, the point on which 
the reasoning depends, without which the chain, however 
compact, must fall to the ground. Eeasoning, then, in 
opposition to Simple Intuition, as well as to Instinct 
clearly ascertained, is utterly thrown away, is worthless, 
and worse than worthless, for it is unnatural, a war of 
the child against the parent. One of the most ingenious 
works of the present day, which professes to make Meta- 
physics a demonstrative science, errs in this very parti- 
cular that it sets up reasoning in opposition to a higher 
Eeason, to Simple Intuition. 

11. All reasoning consists in drawing intuitive infer- 
ences ; but all inferences are not intuitive, and therefore 
all inferences are not cases of reasoning. Instances of 
the latter kind of inferences, which may be called non- 
intuitive, are innumerable, but in many cases they are 
so closely connected with the fact from which the infer- 
ence is drawn, that the one is seldom distinguished from 
the other. When the heavens are covered with clouds, 



92 REASON. 

and therefore the sun invisible, I readily infer from the 
light that it is above the horizon, and so with the moon. 
When I see the print of a horse's foot and of wheels, I 
infer that a horse and carriage have passed that way ; 
and when I observe a horse saddled, I infer that some 
one has ridden, or is about to ride upon it. When I 
enter a room and feel it warm, I infer that there is a fire 
before I see it ; and when I perceive a fire-screen in front 
of the chimney, I infer that it is placed to protect from 
heat. In short, most of those convictions as to the cause 
or the effect of every-day occurrences, convictions un- 
attended with any effort, and supposed indisputable, are 
really inferences drawn without reasoning from facts 
observed. Nay, the very existence of outward objects is 
learnt only by inference from certain sensations which 
suggest those objects, and create a belief in their inde- 
pendent existence. On what principle these non-intuitive 
inferences are drawn, and how they may be distinguished 
from intuitive or rational inferences, we shall afterwards 
enquire ; enough for the present to have pointed them 
out. 

12. This much, however, we may at present remark, 
that these non-intuitive inferences are of two kinds, the 
one kind purely instinctive, the other depending partly 
on Instinct or original tendency, partly on Custom. 
Thus, our belief in the material world is an inference 
from certain sensations, and is purely instinctive, for it 
cannot be learnt or acquired from any previous know- 
ledge ; and so is the belief in memory, and in our own 
identity, from consciousness. Our belief in the ordin- 
ary succession of causes and effects depends, in the 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 93 

first instance, no doubt, also upon an Instinct which 
prompts us to expect uniformity in nature; but this 
instinctive tendency is greatly modified afterwards by 
Custom. Besides, however great the tendency may be 
to expect uniformity in nature, this tendency is shown 
only after some one conjunction of events has been 
observed, not before ; and therefore the belief is not 
purely instinctive as in the above cases. Certainly one 
instance of conjunction is not Custom, but it is experi- 
ence, and one experience is necessary to develope the 
tendency to believe in future uniformity. Subsequently, 
frequent repetitions of the conjunction lead us to pass 
rapidly from the one event to the other, from the observed 
to the non-observed, and Instinct and Custom combine 
to fix our belief. Consequently, there are sufficient 
grounds for subdividing non-intuitive inferences into two 
kinds, of which the one may be called purely Instinctive, 
the other Inferences from Experience. 



SECTION SECOND. 
ON DIFFEBENT KINDS OF SEASONING. 

1. Though there is a general resemblance in all Sea- 
soning, yet there are differences sufficient to constitute 
different kinds or species. Thus we continually hear 
Seasoning designated as Demonstrative, Probable, In- 
ductive, Deductive, and so forth, a specific epithet being 



94 REASON. 

added to the general name, according to that natural 
mode of classification and nomenclature which Science 
has adopted and improved. Every kind of plant, every 
kind of animal, is designated by two words, one pointing 
out the Genus, the other the Species, as Ehamnus fran- 
gula, Felis tigris; and this is a natural system, borrowed 
from daily use, as when we talk of the moss rose, the dog 
rose, the Chinese rose, the brown, the black, and the white 
bear. In like manner, the common use of language sup- 
poses different kinds of Seasoning, or at least varieties, 
and these we must now endeavour to fix, and to ascer- 
tain whether they be real kinds, or only varieties. 

2. We have seen that all Reasoning, properly so 
called, is based on simple Intuition. But a great deal of 
what commonly passes under the name of Eeasoning is 
based, not on Intuition, but on Instinct. Thus, our belief 
in uniformity of nature is an Instinct, and from that 
Instinct we draw many inferences which are said to be 
the result of reasoning, or more properly, instances of 
reasoning. We must, therefore, either enlarge our de- 
finition of Eeasoning, or deny that inferences from In- 
stinct are entitled to that name. Allowing for the 
present that they are so entitled, then, at all events, there 
will be a clear distinction between Eeasoning from In- 
tuition, and Eeasoning from Instinct. To the former of 
these we shall first turn our attention. 

I. Of Reasoning a priori. 

3. This distinction between Eeasonings based on 
Simple Intuition, and those based on Instinct, seems to 
coincide with that between a priori and a posteriori 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 95 

reasoning ; for, in the former, by the light of the mind, 
we discern a connection between the propositions ; while, 
in the latter, we only suppose instinctively that there is 
a connection because some similar conjunction has for- 
merly been observed. The Instinctive belief that nature 
is uniform in her operations, in her constitution and 
course, lies at the bottom of all such inferences. 

4. Beginning, then, with Eeasoning properly so called, 
Complex Intuition, a priori reasoning, or Ratiocination, 
which all mean the same thing, we observe in the first 
place, that this also is of two kinds, according as it is 
founded on Intuitive truths, simple and certain, requiring 
no previous knowledge; or otherwise, on supposed truths, 
the result of previous inquiry. These being granted, the 
connection between them and the conclusion drawn is 
no doubt intuitive, but the Premises are not so, and they 
may even be false. In this case, previous inquiry being 
supposed necessary, the whole proof leading to the con- 
clusion is not a priori, though the ultimate reasoning 
be ; and therefore this may be called a priori mixed, in 
opposition to the former, which is a priori pure. Thus, 
all the propositions of Euclid are a priori reasoning pure, 
for they are founded on a few simple self-evident truths 
requiring no previous knowledge, and generalized thus, 
" Two straight lines cannot enclose a space/' " If equals 
be added to equals the wholes are equal/' &c. ; while all 
arguments about matters of fact contingent, such as 
trade ought to be free, therefore the corn trade ought to 
be free, are founded on propositions, the result of previous 
inquiry, not self-evident, and possibly not even true. 

5. A priori reasoning pure is but of one sort. The 



96 REASON. 

matter whereof it treats is all necessary, the reasoning 
demonstrative, and the conclusion therefore infallible. 
But a priori reasoning mixed is of two sorts, according 
as the reasoning is demonstrative or only probable ; 
though in either case, the conclusion is not infallible, 
because the premises are only contingent. And this 
seems to exhaust the divisions of Eeasoning properly so 
called, or Katiocination. 

6. Pure a priori reasoning is confined to the relations 
of Quantity ; for in these alone the matter is necessary, 
the inferences demonstrative, and the conclusions infal- 
lible. This kind of reasoning, therefore, is limited to 
pure Mathematics, which is the science of abstract quan- 
tity, that is, of quantity separate from the material 
universe. Pure Geometry, Arithmetic, and Algebra, do 
not suppose the existence of the material world, and 
they would be true, though that world had no reality. 
This is the reason why the matter in pure Mathematics 
is necessary, for wherever the material world is intro- 
duced, there enters contingency. Thus all the truths of 
mixed Mathematics are contingent, for in them the 
material universe and the laws thereof form the subject 
of inquiry, the existence of that universe being taken 
for granted, and those laws supposed to be proved some- 
how, but not by pure a priori reasoning. Mechanics, 
including statics and dynamics, hydrostatics and hy- 
draulics, pneumatics, and optics, all suppose the exist- 
ence of the material world, either as a solid, a liquid, an 
air, or as light, and, in all these, the science of abstract 
quantity is applied to quantity concrete in these various 
modifications of the world without. Now, as the funda- 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 97 

mental laws of the material world form in these sciences 
the basis of all the inferences, and as these are by no 
means intuitive and certain, but supposed truths, the 
result of previous inquiry, therefore all these sciences 
belong to the mixed a priori class. 

7. Pure a priori reasoning, then, is confined to the 
relations of abstract quantity, called by Hume relations 
of ideas. Nothing can be more simple, more easily com- 
prehended, than this kind of reasoning. It admits of no 
debate, no doubt, no hesitation ; we either assent to it 
entirely or not at all ; and we must master it ourselves, 
for no one else can make it plainer. This necessarily 
follows from its nature, based upon simple Intuition, 
and raised by other intuitions equally simple. The fol- 
lowing is a type of all pure a priori reasoning. 

A is equal to B, and B equal to C ; 

therefore A is equal to C. 
This type will apply to geometry, arithmetic, and alge- 
bra alike, to all reasoning about pure quantity, whether 
continuous or discrete, whether of Space, Time, or Num- 
ber. Take the following as a type of geometrical rea- 
soning : — 

A D G 

bAc eAf hAk 

The triangle A B C is equal to the triangle DEF, and 
the triangle D E F to the triangle 6HK, therefore the 
triangle ABC is equal to the triangle G-HK. If a 
person do not at once assent to this conclusion, his 
case is hopeless. 

8. If these be correct specimens of mathematical 
reasoning, then all such reasoning consists of three pro- 



98 REASON. 

positions. And so it must from the nature of the case. 
If we could draw an infallible conclusion from one Pro- 
position only, then the second or inferred proposition 
could be only a repetition of the first in another form ; it 
could not contain anything really new. Were there any 
thing new except the phraseology, then the conclusion 
could not be infallible, for it would not be comprehended 
in the premises. Consequently, three propositions, at 
least, are essential to every step of mathematical reason- 
ing. Every such step must comprise premises and a 
conclusion, the former containing two propositions. 

9. From the above it appears that there is no differ- 
ence in any one respect between the two propositions of 
the mathematical premises, except in this, that the 
middle oi^e may be compared directly with both the ex- 
tremes. The first is not more important, not more ge- 
neral, than the second ; and if we chose to call it the 
major proposition because one of the terms is contained 
in the conclusion, where it may be made the Predicate, 
well and good; but let us not suppose that the word 
major, in mathematical reasoning, means anything more 
than this. 

10. We thus see that in mathematical reasoning 
there is no descent, no inference from the general to par- 
ticulars. All the propositions which compose the rea- 
soning are equally general, or equally particular. When 
we prove, for instance, that the angles at the base of an 
isosceles triangle are equal, we have no doubt a particular 
diagram, a particular triangle before us ; and so far all 
the propositions of the reasoning may be considered as 
particular ; but the mind instantly generalizes and ap- 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 99 

plies them to all similar triangles ; that is, to all triangles 
with two equal sides. And this it does with certainty, 
for nothing else than the equality of two sides is assumed 
in the course of the reasoning. Mathematical reasoning 
may therefore be called reasoning on a plain, in opposi- 
tion to that whereby we descend from generals to par- 
ticulars, or to the less general. 

11. The only doubt that can now remain as to this 
reasoning is, on what it is founded. Books of Geometry 
usually set out with definitions, axioms, and postulates, 
and it is commonly supposed that from these the Season- 
ing proceeds. Now all discourse supposes that the terms 
made use of are understood, otherwise it would be mere 
gibberish. Therefore, in every discourse, definitions are 
either given or are considered unnecessary, and we have no 
reason to say that mathematical reasoning is based on de- 
finition, more than any other. Many of the definitions of 
geometry are in reality unnecessary, for every one knows 
what is a triangle, a circle, and a square ; but they are 
given pro forma, and to obviate the possibility of a 
mistake. 

12. Is, then, mathematical reasoning based upon 
axioms and postulates ? Now what is an axiom ? It is 
the generalization of a simple, certain, and intuitive, or 
self-evident truth. Now, as particulars are known be- 
fore generals, the truth must have been discerned in parti- 
cular cases before it was generalized; just as the theorems 
of geometry are proved by means of particular diagrams 
before they are seen to be true universally. It is, then, 
on a self-evident truth exemplified in a particular case 
that mathematical reasoning is founded, not on an axiom 



100 REASON. 

or generalization thereof which comes afterwards. Thus, 
in the reasoning, the triangle ABC is equal to the 
triangle DEP, and the triangle D E F to the triangle 
6HK, therefore the triangle A B is equal to the tri- 
angle GHK,we have no occasion for an axiom to prove 
this, though reference to one may be made on the mar- 
gin, but the mind, attentive only to the particular data 
before it, leaps at once to the conclusion. Axioms then 
are not necessary ; they are only neat and comprehen- 
sive expressions to show what is taken for granted in 
many particular instances, and the reasoning would be 
perfectly conclusive without them. 

13. The same may be said of postulates. It is surely 
unnecessary to tell us, generally, that a line may be drawn 
from one point to another, and a circle described about 
a given centre, for every one allows, and, by the laws 
of thought, cannot help allowing, that such a thing is 
conceivable, that is, involves no contradiction, and this 
is all that is required in a geometrical problem ; for in 
pure geometry we deal not with material, but with ideal 
lines and circles. Postulates, then, are unnecessary; 
they tell us nothing ; they merely state, generally, what 
by the fundamental laws of thought we cannot but ac- 
knowledge in every particular instance. 

14. On what, then, is mathematical reasoning found- 
ed ? It is founded on simple, certain, and intuitive, or 
self-evident truths, discerned at first in particular in- 
stances, and generalized afterwards. It is, then, on the 
truth as comprehended by the mind in a particular in- 
stance, not on the subsequent generalization, that the 
reasoning is based. 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 101 

15. Pure a priori or mathematical reasoning is valu- 
able as a type of perfect ratiocination, starting from cer- 
tain and intuitive or self-evident truths, proceeding by 
unerring and intuitive inferences from these, and arriv- 
ing at last at conclusions entirely new, which, without 
reasoning, could never have been known or hardly sus- 
pected. Who, prior to demonstration, could ever have 
supposed that, in a right angled triangle, the square of 
the side opposite the right angle should be equal to the 
squares of the two sides containing the right angle? 
Such conclusions as these are arrived at only after a very 
long chain of reasoning, and are real discoveries, not 
merely explicit statements of something implied in the 
premises and therefore really known beforehand, as in 
the syllogism of the schools. 

16. Mixed a priori reasoning differs from pure in this, 
that the bases on which it rests are not self-evident nor 
even certain; so that were the reasoning unassailable, 
the conclusion might still be false. Thus all the reason- 
ings of mechanical philosophy start from a few general 
laws of motion which are assuredly not self-evident, 
and are only arrived at by generalization a posteriori, 
that is by experience, which can never give infallible re- 
sults. So all general reasonings about morals and politics 
rest on certain facts in human nature supposed to be 
known from experience, though they may not be univer- 
sally true, and may have many limitations. At the best, 
they are neither self-evident nor certain. But this kind 
of enquiry admits of subdivision, according as the rea- 
soning is demonstrative or only probable. 

17. Demonstrative mixed a priori reasoning is again 



102 REASON. 

of two sorts, as it is employed about quantity, or 
about other things. When employed about quantity it 
raises the whole structure of mechanical philosophy — 
that is the philosophy which treats of sensible rest and 
motion, whether in solids, liquids, or gaseous matter, 
comprehending statics, dynamics, hydrostatics, hydrau- 
lics, pneumatics, and optics. Celestial mechanics, or 
physical astronomy, is only an application of the gene- 
ral principles of mechanics to the motions of the hea- 
venly bodies. In all these sciences the reasoning is 
strictly demonstrative, though the ground on which they 
rest may be shaken. Thus the law of gravitation has 
been and may still be assailed, and the Copernican sys- 
tem of the universe may still be called in question. We 
may even doubt about the laws of motion. Moreover, 
the conclusions of theory are not always found correct in 
practice ; not because the reasoning has been incorrect 
from the data, but because the data have been insuffi- 
cient. 

18. This is the sort of reasoning which contributes 
most to the self-complacency of man, for it has raised 
the most secure, the most spacious, and the most lofty 
fabric, the glory and the crown of human efforts. By 
means of this reasoning we have not only directed all 
the powers of nature at our will, and turned them to our 
use by the aid of machinery ; we have not only abridged 
Time and Space upon earth ; but we have measured the 
distances of the heavenly bodies, weighed them in the 
balance, determined their movements, calculated their 
return to any spot in the sky, nay, announced the exist- 
ence of planets before they were apparent to mortal sight. 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 103 

Such achievements, not to be contested, may swell the 
pride of man and induce him to look down with pity and 
contempt upon sciences open to doubt, full of noise and 
controversy ; but these, if they teach us humility, may 
be more profitable, morally, than the others. If me- 
chanical philosophy shows the strength, moral philoso- 
phy testifies to the imperfection of the human intellect ; 
and we ought to be aware of both. The worst tendency 
of Mathematics is to make us discard every thing which 
admits not of demonstration ; but this is mere narrow- 
ness of mind, which knows nothing beyond its own 
sphere. The most important quality of a truly philoso- 
phic mind is comprehensiveness. 

19. But may not demonstrative mixed a priori rea- 
soning be applied to other subjects than quantity? 
That is a great question. Quality differs from Quantity 
in this, that the differences of the latter are fixed and 
determinate, even the smallest, while those of the former 
are indeterminate, one quality gradually, and often in- 
sensibly, passing into another. How can such differ- 
ences be the subject of demonstration ? 

20. This fundamental difference between Quantity 
and Quality seems to me decisive of the question. Now 
morals treat of Qualities, and therefore morals do not 
admit of demonstration. When then we do meet with 
reasonings about relations other than those of Quantity 
which bear a demonstrative air, we may fairly suspect 
that they are demonstrative only in appearance, in form, 
not in vitality ; that is, they contain in the conclusion 
nothing really different from the premises ; what is stated 
in general in the one, being stated in particular in the 



104 REASON, 

other. Now this Is the whole secret of that specious sort 
of demonstration, the Syllogism of the Schools ; which 
never did, and never can lead to any discovery, to any 
thing not already known, because the universal propo- 
sition, which forms one of the premises of the Syllogism, 
must comprehend the conclusion, or there is no formal 
proof. This mock sort of demonstration, though lab- 
oured by the most subtle of men for many ages, has pro- 
duced nothing, while real demonstrative reasoning has 
raised a mighty fabric reaching even to the stars. 1 

21. But mixed a priori reasoning may be probable 
only, not demonstrative ; and to this class by far the 
greater part of our ordinary ratiocination belongs. Most 
of our every day reasonings are not about Quantity, and 
therefore, in general, they are not demonstrative. They 
cannot then be subject to the strict rules of the Schol- 
astic Syllogism, which is demonstrative in form at least, 
and consequently is certainly conclusive, or certainly 
inconclusive, according as these rules have or have 
not been observed. Probable reasoning, as the word 
enounces, has no such certainty, and therefore no certain 
rule whereby it may be tested. Still, that part of Logic 
which treats of fallacies tends to guard against error in 
probable reasoning, and to detect it, though not infal- 
libly. 

22. Probable mixed a priori reasoning agrees with 
that mock species of demonstration called the Syllogism 
in this, that both start from general propositions to arrive 

1 For a full inquiry into the nature and value of the Scholastic 
Syllogism, see the Author's "Principles of Psychology." Part III., 
chap. 10. 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 105 

at conclusions less general ; but the difference is that in 
the Syllogism the proposition is universal, in Prob- 
able reasoning, general only. When a proposition is 
true universally, or at least allowed to be so, of course 
every less general proposition comprehended under it 
must be true also; no reasoning is required to prove 
that; but when a proposition is true only in general, 
then reasoning is required to prove that any proposition 
is comprehended under it. Thus if we assert that all 
trade ought to be free, no doubt the trade in slave-grown 
sugar ought to be free ; but if we merely assert that 
trade in general ought to be free, the question may still 
arise whether the trade in slave-grown sugar should or 
should not be an exception. And this may create a long 
discussion wherein all the arguments are not on one 
side, as they are in demonstration, but where one must 
be balanced against the other till we see which side shall 
on the whole preponderate. And though in this case 
the conclusion after all is only probable, yet the inquiry 
is a far more improving intellectual exercise than the 
uniform certainty of demonstrative reasoning. 

23. When a proposition is universal, of course there 
is no room for limitation or exception ; but when it is 
only general, other general principles may come into 
play, and conflict one with another. Thus, when we 
assert, in general, that trade ought to be free, this may 
be true as far as wealth is concerned ; but it is also true 
that slavery ought by all means to be discouraged, and 
these two propositions are conflicting. Which do we 
think most important, a slight fall in the price of sugar, 
or a blow struck at slavery ? This sort of suspense can 



106 BEASON. 

never occur in demonstrative reasoning, which prevents 
all distressing doubt, satisfies the intellect by its certainty, 
flatters us by its infallibility, and throws undue discredit 
on mere probability. No doubt it was this longing after 
certainty which led to the invention of the Scholastic 
Syllogism, and rendered it so popular, for it presents the 
phantom, at least, if not the reality of a demonstration, 
a phantom which has deluded many all their lives, a 
will o' the wisp which leads to nothing. To the School 
Logician, as well as to the Mathematician, probability is 
a poor thing, unworthy of the name of Philosophy, un- 
worthy even of the name of Science, which should deal 
in strict demonstration. What can come of rigid de- 
monstration in Metaphysical Science may be judged of 
by a modern publication professedly founded and raised 
thereupon, which, after a laboured inquiry and proposi- 
tion on proposition, ends in nothing. Such must ever 
be the case where demonstration is introduced into sub- 
jects not its own ; the demonstration is a sham, and the 
result disappointment. Probability and doubt, which go 
together, may be unsatisfactory, distressing, humiliating, 
but they are, for the most part, the condition of man on 
earth ; and though infallible reasoning may be as com- 
fortable as an infallible church, yet we seldom can have 
the one, and never the other. 

24. We have shown that all real demonstrative rea- 
soning must consist of three propositions at least ; but 
probable reasoning may have only two. That mode of 
speech which possesses the form without the reality of 
reasoning, namely, the Scholastic Syllogism, is also always 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 107 

stated in three propositions ; though sometimes one of 
them is superfluous. Thus in the Syllogism, — 

All trade ought to be free ; 

The trade in slave-grown sugar is a trade ; 

Therefore the trade in slave-grown sugar ought to be 
free. 
The second proposition is manifestly a tautology, re- 
dundant and useless ; and the inference, such as it is, 
may be drawn directly : 

All trade ought to be free, 

Therefore the trade in slave-grown sugar ought to be 
free. 
If this be worthy of the name of reasoning, then demon- 
strative reasoning may consist of only two propositions ; 
but here, it is evident, no new truth is elicited, nothing 
not evidently comprehended under the first proposition, 
and therefore the reasoning is purely formed, not real. 
This then is no exception to the rule, that all real de- 
monstrative reasoning, all which teaches us something, 
must have three propositions. But in probable reason- 
ing it is otherwise. There, an inference may be drawn 
directly from a general proposition, and as it is not evi- 
dently and necessarily comprehended under that pro- 
position, the proof is entitled to the name of reasoning. 

Thus, trade, in general, ought to be free ; 

Therefore, the trade in slave-grown sugar ought to be 
free, 
may be allowed to be reasoning, not in form only, but in 
reality, for it teaches us something new, something not 
identical with the first proposition, and consequently it 
contains a real inference, though only a probable one, 



108 REASON. 

and so liable to dispute. And tlie inference is only 
probable, because it is drawn only from a general propo- 
sition, which, as such, does not exclude other general 
propositions, which may modify or reverse the conclu- 
sion. In like manner, the long series of inferences 
drawn by Bentham and his followers from their favourite 
proposition that all men are governed by their interests 
admits of numerous exceptions, if the universality of the 
proposition be denied, or if it be so understood as to 
be true indeed, but a barren truism, such as, that all 
men are moved by some desire or other, desire of some- 
thing which they like. 

25. Though the connection between the general pro- 
position and the conclusion, in probable mixed a priori 
reasoning, be not necessary, yet, such as it is, it is seen 
intuitively, 1 or not at all. A long series of propositions 
maybe required to arrive at the final conclusion, but the 
connection between each premiss and each conclusion 
rests upon its own inward evidence, not upon anything 
without ; it must strike the mind by its own power, not by 
any borrowed force ; it may be discerned, but cannot be 
proved. Thus the connection between the general pro- 
position, " Trade ought to be free/' and the conclusion, 
"the trade in slave-grown sugar ought to be free," is 
seen at once, is seen to be a probable connection, but 
not a necessary one, unless we begin by assuming that 

1 The word Intuition, as understood throughout this work, does not 
necessarily imply self-evident certain knowledge, but any knowledge, 
certain or probable, which the mind discerns at once without the inter- 
vention of proof. And even where proof is necessary, each step in that 
proof, each separate inference, is discerned intuitively. 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 109 

" all trade ought to be free," a proposition which would 
justify even the slave trade. 

26. Is there, then, no form of probable reasoning but 
that which proceeds from a general principle to infer one 
less general, comprehended under it ? This we cannot 
maintain without contradicting the plain evidence of facts. 
Other relations than that of comprehension are traced 
by probable reasoning. Take the following instance : — 

A is greater than B, and B is probably greater than 
C, therefore A is probably (only) greater than 0. 

Or A is probably greater than B, 

And B is certainly greater than C, 

Therefore A is probably greater than C. 
Here we have the relation of Quantity ; but the reason- 
ing is probable only ; and there is no descent from a 
general proposition to one less general. 

In Blunt's "Undesigned Coincidences," (Appendix, 
xv,) 3 I find the following sentence : "From this pass- 
age it appears that a pavement was near the Castle of 
Antonia ; but we have already seen that the Castle of 
Antonia was near the palace (or Pilate's hall) ; there- 
fore this pavement was near Pilate's hall." All will 
allow that this is legitimate reasoning, though there is 
here no descent from general to particular or to less 
general, all the propositions being alike in this respect, 
on a plain, as it were, as in pure Mathematics, all, in 
fact, being singular propositions; but the reasoning is 
not demonstrative, on account of the indeterminate word 
near, which may mean six yards or sixty. 

Again, A is similar to B, 

And B is similar to C ; 



110 SEASON. 

Therefore A is probably (only) similar to ; 
for though A and be both similar to B, the points of 
similarity between each of them and B may be different, 
so that between A and C there may be little or no re- 
semblance. The eyes of one man may be like to those 
of another, and the mouth of the second to that of a 
third ; but the eyes and mouth of the first and the third 
person may be unlike. Here there is the relation of 
Besemblance ; and the reasoning is probable, yet we do 
not start from a general proposition to arrive at one less 
general comprehended under it. This may serve as an 
instance of the impossibility of reducing Quality to de- 
monstration. Probable reasoning, then, no more than all 
reasoning, can be reduced to one common form or type ; 
it assumes a variety of shapes according to the multitude 
of subjects to which it is applied, and the diversity of 
relations which it traces ; it cannot be crarnpt within the 
limits of a narrow system, and rebels against our love of 
uniformity ; though in this all a priori reasoning agrees, 
that from one or more propositions known, or at least 
allowed, we infer some other proposition not previously 
known or allowed, infer intuitively, without foreign aid, 
by the native force of the mind, in a word, by pure 
Beason. 

II. Of Seasoning a posteriori. 

1. In the opening of this inquiry, while we divided 
all reasoning into two kinds, the a priori and the a pos- 
teriori^ we at the same time remarked, that, so great was 
the difference between them, it might well be questioned 
whether the latter were entitled to the name of Beason- 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. Ill 

ing or not, but, in compliance with established usage, 
we should, provisionally, at least, allow it that title. 
We have now to inquire into the nature of this sort of 
Seasoning, and to determine whether it can ; with phil- 
osophical accuracy, be so called. 

2. All reasoning of this kind proceeds upon the fun- 
damental assumption that from a number, more or less, 
of well- chosen examples of certain facts of co-existence 
or of succession, known by experience, we may safely 
infer that a similar co-existence or a similar succession 
will hold good in all cases apparently alike, though in 
these cases the fact of co-existence or of succession has 
not been actually observed. Thus, having dissected one 
horse, and learnt his structure, we believe that all animals 
bearing the outward marks of a horse are similarly 
framed within ; and having observed that fire will con- 
sume wood to-day, we doubt not that it will consume 
wood to-morrow. That we are constantly drawing 
such inferences, sometimes without hesitation, without 
effort, almost without consciousness of any inference ; at 
other times, in more complicated and obstruse cases, 
after deliberation, and doubtingly, is certain ; but the 
question still remains ; are these inferences instances of 
Eeasoning or not, are they rational or instinctive ? 

3. If these inferences are rational, than are they intui- 
tive, that is, the mind by its own force, without any ex- 
traneous aid, discerns the connection and draws the 
inference. But can this be affirmed in the present case ? 
Why must all horses be alike internally ? Why must 
fire which consumed wood yesterday consume other 
wood to-day ? for neither the fire nor the wood is the 



112 REASON. 

same as that of yesterday ? Most persons probably will 
consider these questions too simple to require an answer. 
We do not easily allow a difficulty where none has ever 
been suspected ; we require no reason for that which has 
constantly been taken for granted. Common inferences 
from experience have been made so often, so long, so 
rapidly, and so surely, that to doubt them seems absurd, 
irrational ; but the doubt is not contrary to Keason, it is 
only contrary to Instinct. Turn the question over and 
over, probe it to the bottom, and still you will find no 
reason for your belief in the uniformity of nature, which 
all your inferences suppose ; and if your belief be not 
rational, it must be instinctive. To doubt of this unifor- 
mity seems indeed monstrous, it shocks us extremely, not 
only because it is opposed to instinct, but also to Custom ; 
for though the belief begins with instinct, it is afterwards 
so fortified by custom that doubt becomes next to im- 
possible. When similar phenomena have been observed 
to recur in similar circumstances over and over again, a 
habit is formed of expecting one phenomenon as soon as 
another appears, a habit which becomes irresistible, which 
precludes all doubt, silences all objections, and makes us 
stare at the man who would interrupt it, as one would 
at a madman or a fool. But Instinct and Custom or 
Association are here the sources of our belief, and the 
man who is bold enough to oppose these is thought to 
oppose reason. 

4. It is to this force of custom, and not to reason, that 
we ought to attribute many of those actions of the lower 
animals which appear rational. Animals can be taught 
many things. The pointer dog is taught to drop after 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 113 

fire, not to bark, not to chase hares and rabbits, all con- 
trary to his nature ; but is reason his teacher ? To explain 
the result we need not call in so lofty a faculty, for a 
lower one will suffice. The dog has memory, for with- 
out that he could learn nothing, and he can remember 
the flogging which followed any transgression of the rules 
of sporting, at least after several repetitions of the offence 
and punishment, till the one becomes indissolubly associ- 
ated with the other, and every new occasion of misconduct 
suggests the former penalty. In this there is no necessity 
for Seasoning, or even for Eeason at all, since mere asso- 
ciation of a certain action with pain, founded on memory, 
will account for the phenomena. When I put on my hat, 
and take up my stick, my dog leaps up for joy, because 
these acts are associated in his mind with going out, in 
which he delights. 

5. That the lower animals should be so much led by 
Custom need not surprise us, when we know that man 
himself is subject to the same influence. In him, no 
doubt, it is counterbalanced by Reason, more or less in 
particular instances, but the force of custom though 
weakened is never destroyed. Reason and custom are 
always at war, and sometimes the one gains the mastery, 
sometimes the other. In the unthinking, the latter of 
course bears sway ; in reflecting minds, the former has 
greater, but not undivided, influence. No one knows 
how much he is led by custom. Custom may have ori- 
ginated in Reason, but in the course of time the reason 
is often forgotten while the custom still remains. Thus, 
the annual promenade along the Champs Elysees to the 
Bois de Boulogne, in Passion week, arose out of a reli- 



114 REASON. 

gious procession to the convent of Longchamp ; and the 
promenade remains, though any religious, or indeed any 
idea whatsoever connected with it, has totally vanished. 
At present, the promenade is senseless, but it continues. 
Hallowe'en is still observed in Scotland, though, as the 
vigil of All Saints' day, it is quite forgotten ; but were it 
remembered as such, it no doubt would excite the pious 
indignation of Presbyterians. Burns has written a poem 
on Hallowe'en, but certainly no religious idea connected 
with it can there be discovered. The year in Scotland 
is still divided by four terms, known as Candlemas, 
Whitsuntide, Lammas, and Martinmas; though the 
procession of the candles is now only seen in St Peter's, 
and the Descent of the Holy Grhost, the Assumption of 
the Blessed Virgin, and the Feast of St Martin, are 
blotted out of the Presbyterian calendar. 

6. Affection to a ruling dynasty, so important a poli- 
tical element, often denied and ridiculed by superficial 
declaimers, liable no doubt to excess and misdirec- 
tion, but, on the whole, most beneficial ; the source of 
internal peace, of security, and hence of lenity in the 
prince, of repose in the people, of present prosperity and 
future progress, is owing almost entirely to Custom. The 
people are attached to a dynasty not because it is good 
to be so attached, not from Eeason, but because the 
dynasty is old. For the same cause do they respect old 
families, families whom they and their fathers have been 
accustomed to see in high place, to look up to, and to 
love. No doubt respect for old families depends also 
upon respect for continuity, for continuity supposes some 
virtue, some moral excellence. Wealth possessed by the 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 115 

same family for many generations certainly argues some- 
thing in its favour. The privileges of primogeniture 
may or may not be wise, but where they have long been 
established, they are fondly cherished by all, even by 
those who seem to lose by them. Few younger sons in 
Great Britain would have the right of the elder abolished. 
And what a hold on our reverence has the supposed 
continuity of the clerical line from Christ to the existing 
ministry through the Apostles ! 

7. The powerful influence of Custom on both our 
opinions and actions being a fact indisputable, generally 
allowed, though not to the full extent, it will the more 
readily be admitted as probable that many conclusions 
supposed to be reached by Reasoning are really owing to 
Instinct fortified by Custom. Our every day inferences 
regarding matters of fact cannot surely be traced to 
Reasoning. What reasoning is required to believe, or 
what reasoning could prove that fire will always burn, 
water drown, or that the sun will rise and set to-morrow ? 
In these and innumerable such instances, there is mani- 
festly no occasion for reasoning, and no grounds for it, 
because uniformity in time past, were it ever so perfect, 
and ever so well known, could never prove uniformity in 
time to come. And reasoning is here not only imprac- 
ticable but unnecessary, for we believe, and firmly believe 
such uniformity long before we can reason. But all in- 
ferences from experience, however remote, however diffe- 
rent from ordinary facts, were founded on the same blind 
belief, common to the clown and the philosopher, and, 
therefore, their basis, at least, is not Reasoning, nor any 
form of Reason. 



116 REASON. 

8. If this doctrine be correct, if our belief in the 
uniformity of nature be founded not on Keason but on 
Instinct fortified by Custom, then can our disbelief in 
exceptions to this uniformity have no other foundation 
than this, that we are unaccustomed to them. Few have 
the presumption to deny the possibility of such excep- 
tions, or of miracles, thus arrogating to themselves an 
intimate acquaintance with the secrets of nature ; but 
the extreme improbability of exceptions is maintained by 
many, an improbability, according to Hume, as good as 
a demonstration. That philosopher was the first, how- 
ever, to broach the opinion that all our inferences from 
experience are based on Custom, not on Eeasoning, or 
more properly, are not instances of reasoning, not based 
upon Keason, and, consequently, our Belief in Uniform- 
ity, and disbelief in want of Uniformity, or in miracles, 
rest, according to him, on Custom alone. If then, as 
Hume asserts, the argument against miracles from the 
invariable course of nature, be " as entire as any argu- 
ment from experience can possibly be imagined/' let us 
remember that the argument, allowing it entitled to the 
name, rests entirely upon Custom, according to him, 
upon Instinct afterwards fortified by Custom, according 
to us, not upon Keason. Custom, or Instinct and Cus- 
tom together, are the causes, the metaphysical causes of 
our Belief or our disbelief, but they -are not logical 
causes or reasons which justify such belief or disbelief. 
Powerful causes no doubt they are, and influence us they 
always will ; but, being independent of Reason, they can- 
not, without prejudice, be brought to silence all argu- 
ments derived from that higher faculty. 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 117 

It is necessary to insist upon this power of Custom. So 
strong is it, so insidious, so little known to ourselves, tliat 
any deviation from Uniformity appears to us monstrous, 
and all belief in want of uniformity seems opposed to com- 
mon sense, that is, to common Keason. We shall admit 
with difficulty that Eeason is here not concerned, that the 
mind is shocked, not by a violation of rational thought, but 
by a breach of what is usual, Thus is Custom mistaken 
for Eeason, and receives that homage due only to a 
higher power. 

9. Innumerable answers have appeared to Hume's 
famous Essay on Miracles, but hitherto the true philoso- 
phical answer has never, I believe, been given. He is 
refuted on his own principles ; and those principles, with 
the modification above suggested, seem to me sound. 
If all our inferences from Experience be founded on 
Custom alone, or on Instinct fortified by Custom, then 
these inferences are not founded on Keason ; and there- 
fore cannot be brought forward as arguments, much less 
as infallible arguments, against any rational conclusion. 
Our incredulity to miracles depends then not on Eeason, 
but on the interruption to what is usual ; and our Belief 
in the same is opposed, not to the rational faculty, but 
to the power of Custom. Properly speaking, we have no 
reason to give against miracles ; but we believe them with 
difficulty because they are unusual. The argument of 
Hume, then, thoroughly probed, amounts only to this, not 
that our experience of the laws of nature, were it even 
hitherto unalterable, as he assumes, is any argument, 
much less an unanswerable argument, against an occa- 
sional violation of those laws, of the secret causes of 



118 REASON. 

which we know nothing ; but only, that the great uni- 
formity hitherto observed forces us to believe in continued 
uniformity. The cause, the metaphysical cause, of our 
Belief or Disbelief, is here truly stated, but that cause is 
not a logical one, not a Keason. This seems the true 
answer to Hume's Essay, and its importance cannot be 
over-rated. As St Paul said to King Agrippa, " Why 
should it be thought a thing incredible with you, that 
God should raise the dead ?" It was incredible, simply 
because unusual, not irrational. 

These observations will enable us to determine what 
is to be thought of those who deny the possibility of 
miracles ; possibility " of any modifications whatever in 
the existing condition of material agents, unless through 
the invariable operation of a series of eternally-impressed 
consequences following in some necessary chain of orderly 
connection/' x Well might Hamlet say to such, 

" There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, 
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy." 

That a creature like man, with intelligence enough in 
some degree to appreciate the wonders of creation, enough 
to see how very little he does know, or is ever likely to 
know, how inexplicable ever thing ultimately is, should 
presume to talk of the impossibility of any change in 
the ordinary course of nature, shows a degree of ignor- 
ance and presumption, ludicrous, if not pitiable. Before 
pronouncing, dogmatically, on this point, man must be 
as Grod, he must know all, the first springs or principles 
of everything. Religious dogmatism may be excused, 
when built upon any believed revelation, and though not 
1 Oxford " Essays and Reviews. " 1860. Essay III. 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 119 

shared it may meet with sympathy, for in religion all 
doubt is distressing ; but irreligious dogmatism has no 
excuse, either in Philosophy or in Sentiment. 

10. What are we then to think of Inductive Season- 
ing commonly so called ? Is this a misnomer, or is it 
not ? It is quite certain, and indeed is generally ad- 
mitted, that a great part of the process which goes under 
the name of Induction, is unconnected with Seasoning 
proper. First there is the observation of facts, facts of 
Co-existence or of Succession ; then the scrutiny of these 
facts, in order to determine whether there be any constant, 
or only a casual co-existence or succession; next comes the 
separation of the variable from the invariable elements, 
for there are always some of the former ; and the latter 
being ascertained, there is really nothing else to do. No 
doubt, we infer from thence that what has hitherto been 
invariable will so continue ; but no reasoning is required 
for this, no effort of mind whatever, scarcely an act of 
consciousness, so rapid, so unavoidable is the conse- 
quence. If past uniformity be established, we want no- 
thing more, and we should be surprised if any one should 
suppose anything more to be required ; not that uni- 
formity in future is really proved, but that no proof is 
thought to be necessary. And no proof is thought to 
be necessary because an Instinct of our nature prevents 
all doubt. We should as soon doubt the existence of 
the material world, as that past uniformity should not 
be reproduced. We must conclude, then, that in Induc- 
tion there is no place for Eeasoning, properly so called, 
and that the attempt to bring it into logical form by sup- 
plying, in all cases, a Major Premiss, such as " Nature 



120 REASON. 

is uniform in her operations/' or some one similar, is 
only one of the many instances where nature has been sac- 
rificed to the spirit of system, to the love of regularity. 
Nature is uniform in her operations. But there is a great 
deal of variety as well as of uniformity in nature, and 
this general proposition tells us not where to expect the 
one, and where the other. Nothing can be more vague 
and undefined, and consequently nothing less fitted for 
a Logical Premiss. Because there is a great deal of 
uniformity in nature, no one can thence infer that there 
will be uniformity in any particular case. As a logical 
Premiss, therefore, the proposition is useless. 

This mistake bears some resemblance to that whereby 
General Axioms were considered as the foundation of 
Mathematical reasoning. Particular cases of axiomatic 
truths must have been discerned before the general 
axiom was formed, and these are sufficient for the rea- 
soning, which need not wait till axioms be framed to 
establish its validity ; and so, conjunctions of phenomena 
were observed over and over again, and on that account 
alone expected in future, long before any general propo- 
sitions relative to uniformity were framed, and conse- 
quently without any reference to such a proposition. 
These propositions, like the axioms of Mathematics, are 
digests of our knowledge, convenient formulas in which 
much previous knowledge is summed up, not the ground 
of our knowledge. 

It is generally allowed that there are few finer speci- 
mens of a posteriori reasoning than Butler s Analogy. 
But to what does this reasoning amount ? The whole 
object of the writer is to trace a similarity between the 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 121 

doctrines of Natural Keligion and the constitution and 
course of Nature ; and again between the doctrines of 
Eevealed and those of Natural Eeligion. These two 
similarities being established, the whole case is made out. 
No Seasoning is required to prove from thence that the 
Author of Nature is the God of Nature, as well of Ee- 
vealed Eeligion. This conclusion is no doubt irresistible, 
but it is not arrived at by reasoning. A sort of logical 
form might no doubt be given, as this — 

Like Effects spring from like Causes ; 
The doctrines of Natural and Eevealed Eeligion are like 
to each other, and to the constitution and course of 
Nature ; they are all like effects ; therefore they had all 
the same cause or Author. This argument, however, 
such as it is, is of no avail, is of no logical value ; for 
the words like or similar, are too vague to admit of any 
legitimate inference. Likeness admits of innumerable 
degrees. But there is a degree of likeness in the effect 
from which we infer without hesitation likeness in the 
cause ; though the inference is not logical. The at- 
tempt, then, to rest an Inductive conclusion on Pre- 
mises such as these, tends to diminish rather than to 
increase their certainty. 

11. Though, in Induction, Seasoning, properly so 
called, does not come into play, yet, in difficult cases, the 
highest powers of Eeason are required. In simple and 
every-day cases of inference from experience, Eeason is 
scarcely, if at all necessary ; the natural tendency guided 
and strengthened by Custom suffices. Thus animals, 
possibly not devoid of Eeasoning, though certainly pos- 
sessing it in a very small degree as compared with man, 



122 



HEASON. 



are quick enough to avoid impending danger, Still, no 
animal but man is capable of patient and long-continued 
Induction. Here, not only high intellectual, but also 
rare moral qualities are necessary ; keenness of discrim- 
ination, a clear insight into the fundamental elements of 
a sequence, patience and dexterity in making experi- 
ments, no impatience of doubt, but long forbearance in 
coming to a conclusion. In all this, the only difficulty 
is to determine what is, and what is not invariable ; and 
for this purpose many rules and canons have been drawn 
up, especially by Bacon, in the second part of the No- 
vum Organum, by Dr Whewell in his Philosophy of the 
Inductive Sciences, and by Mr Mill in the inductive por- 
tion of his work on Logic. These are quite different 
from the common rules of Logic, which do not depend 
at all upon experience, but are necessary laws of thought, 
laws which bring their own evidence along with them, 
the proof of which is within and not without. If, then, 
we still talk of Inductive Logic, we must remember that 
the term Logic is here used in a far wider sense than 
that of pure Logic or Logic proper, that it must com- 
prehend all science which professes to direct the under- 
standing in the pursuit of Truth, a scope far beyond that 
of Logic proper, which aims not at Truth directly, but 
only at consistency. Pure Logic is unique, its limits are 
narrow but definite ; while that Logic, which would 
embrace Induction, is vast, but of uncertain boundary. 
The former demands no original knowledge, only natural 
subtlety ; while Induction rests upon facts learnt by ex- 
perience, and the more the better. The best reasoner 
will be the best logician, however false his conclusions ; 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 123 

but if conclusions be false, Induction must be bad. If 
the premises be false, or, though not utterly false, par- 
tial, the finest reasoning will lead to errour ; nay, if the 
reasoning be faultless, errour is inevitable; but good 
Induction must lead to truth. Good Induction consists 
in observing a sufficient number of facts, and in 
thoroughly sifting them, in order to discover what in 
these facts is casual and what invariable ; and that as- 
certained, there is no occasion for reasoning ; for we 
believe instinctively that the future will be like the past, 
that like causes will be followed by like effects, and that 
like effects will indicate like causes. 

The pure logician may be the most ignorant of men, 
though very subtle ; but the Inductive Philosopher must 
be informed, though not an acute reasoner. There were no 
more subtle reasoners than the Schoolmen, though they 
knew nothing ; but the followers of Bacon have observed 
much, and reasoned little. Pure Logic is an admirable 
mental exercise, though liable to abuse and often barren, 
while induction is fruitful in results, but of less value as 
a whetstone to the intellect. There is the same differ- 
ence between them as between Geometry and Analy- 
tics ; the former is the more improving, the latter the 
more manageable and expeditious, — the one makes acute 
mathematicians, the other determines the Mechanism of 
the Heavens. The doctrine of proportion affords an 
excellent example of the two processes. The fifth Book 
of Euclid, which treats of proportion, is lengthy, diffi- 
cult, and laborious, but on that very account an excel- 
lent exercise ; while the same truths may be reached 



124 REASON. 

Analytically, shortly, easily, and quickly, and therefore, 
to the mind, unprofitably. 

12. There seems to be a natural antagonism between 
Observers and Eeasoners. The former stigmatize the 
latter as theorists, system-builders, dreamers, perhaps 
metaphysicians ; while these hurl back upon their adver- 
saries the names of dull plodders and laborious pioneers, 
useful perhaps in their way, but of slow parts, and no 
originality. The one upholds the mind itself and its 
processes, as chiefly, if not alone worthy of regard ; he 
boldly proclaims, that, " In nature there is nothing great 
but Man, in man nothing great but Mind f he looks to 
individual development of intellect rather than to the 
general and material result, to search after truth rather 
than to truth itself ; nay, he may consider our masters 
of modern science, with all their acquirements, no better, 
for the most part, than u intellectual barbarians/' when 
compared with Aristotle or Plato. 1 The other points to 
results ; he shows the progress of Physical Science, the 
numerous applications thereof to the wants of men, the 
diffusion of comfort, the increase of power over nature, 
and these, he exclaims, are my doing. While you were 
syllogizing, while you were straw-splitting, while you 
were reasoning yourselves out of every thing, and at last 
confessing that " nought is everything, and every thing 
is nought/' I was laboriously, painfully, and persever- 
ingly observing and experimenting, and I, accordingly, 
have reaped a rich harvest, while you were reaping the 
winds. While you were doubting about the existence 

1 See Sir William Hamilton s " Discussions on Philosophy." Art. II. 
p. 39. 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 125 

of matter, I moulded it to my wishes ; and while you 
called in question the things near and around us, I dis- 
covered other worlds, and made known the system of the 
universe. Such is the contrast, such the disagreement 
between Eeasoning and Observation, a contrast which will 
never end, because it is founded in nature, and neither 
side can ever be destroyed, neither antagonist ever 
silenced. 

13. This doctrine, that there is no such thing, properly 
speaking, as Inductive Eeasoning, may be new, and 
therefore it will be attacked, and if it cannot be strictly 
refuted, it may still be depreciated as a mere play upon 
words. But underneath the question of words lies one 
of things, the question whether Induction embrace any 
mental process so similar to other reasoning as to be 
properly called by the same name, for names would be 
utterly useless did they not stand for things similar. 
This is a real psychological question, and according as it 
is determined, the name will or not be given. 

14. Mr Mills System of Logic embraces two parts, 
the Eatiocinative and the Inductive ; whence it ought 
to follow that Induction is not ratiocination, — is not 
a process of reasoning. Though this be true, and Induc- 
tion is not reasoning, does not contain reasoning, yet it 
may be the foundation of reasoning ; for, from the general 
facts or general principles arrived at by Induction, reason- 
ings may follow. And, no doubt, from this mixture, the 
opinion has been derived that Induction itself is a reason- 
ing process. These general facts or principles, when 
allowed, may serve as the foundation of an argument as 
well as an Intuitive Truth; but ; however cogent the 



126 REASON. 

argument, the conclusion can never be more sure than 
the principle from which it is deduced, 

15. Though Experience be at the bottom of these 
rational inferences, as well as of those wholly emanating 
from experience, yet the difference between them in the 
evidence may be great. Thus, when we infer that all 
ruminating animals have cloven feet, because all hitherto 
observed have them, we draw an inference from experi- 
ence, directly and instinctively, which commands con- 
siderable belief; but could we show that, according to 
principles long and well established, the one was con- 
nected with the other, we should be thoroughly convinced. 
The one conclusion is purely empirical, the other rational, 
though based upon experience. It is thus that the great 
Cuvier was able to determine rationally the habits of 
many extinct species of animals. A certain form of 
bone proves a certain form of muscle, and a certain form 
and size of muscle prove that the animal was carnivorous 
and savage, or graminivorous and mild. In the practice 
of medicine those whose rule is direct experience only 
are stigmatized as Empirics, in opposition to such as 
reason from general principles which arose out of long 
experience. Thus, Induction and Eeasoning, though 
different, and often cultivated pretty exclusively by dif- 
ferent persons, are real auxiliaries and friends the one to 
the other. 

16. How indistinctly this doctrine as to the non-reason- 
ing nature of Induction has hitherto been seen by philo- 
sophers, appears from the inconsistency of their language 
on the subject. For while, at one time, they assert that 
inferences from experience are not " effects of reasoning/' 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 127 

or, are not " founded upon reasoning/' they, at another, 
talk of experimental or inductive as a branch of probable 
reasoning. No one ever saw more clearly than Hume 
that conclusions from experience were not founded on 
reasoning. " I say then, that even after we have experi- 
ence of the operation of cause or effect, our conclusions 
from that experience are not founded on reasoning, or 
any process of the understanding/' — " These two proposi- 
tions are far from being the same, I have found that 
such an object has always been attended ivith such an 
effect, and I foresee that other objects which are in ap- 
pearance similar will be attended with similar effects. 
I shall allow, if you please, that the one proposition may 
be justly inferred from the other : I know, in fact, that 
it is always inferred. But if you insist, that the infer- 
ence is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to pro- 
duce that reasoning. The connection between these 
propositions is not intuitive. There is required a medi- 
um which may enable the mind to draw such an infer- 
ence, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. 
What this medium is, I must confess, passes my com- 
prehension ; and it is incumbent on those to produce it 
who assert that it really exists, and is the origin of all 
our conclusions concerning matter of fact/' 1 Nothing can 
be more explicit than this language, yet the u Treatise of 
Human Nature" by the same author, is designated as 
u An attempt to introduce the experimental Method of 
Reasoning into Moral subjects." This, it may be said, 
was a juvenile work, afterwards disowned by the Author ; 
but the same uncertainty, the same contradiction, which 

1 Hume's Essays : Sceptical Doubts. 



128 REASON. 

appears on this subject in Part III. Sect. XVI., of the 
"Treatise of Human Nature/' reappears in the corres- 
ponding Section IX. of the Essays, " Of the Seasoning of 
Animals." In the following sentence, the contradic- 
tion comes out in bold relief. " But our wonder will, 
perhaps, cease or diminish when we consider that the 
experimental reasoning itself which we possess in com- 
mon with beasts, and on which the whole conduct 
of life depends, is nothing but a species of instinct or 
mechanical power that acts in us unknown to our- 
selves, and in its chief operations is not directed by 
any such relations or comparisons of ideas as are the 
proper objects of our intellectual faculties." Here what 
was reasoning at the opening of the sentence becomes 
instinct before the close. Mr Bailey, in his able work, 
" The Theory of Keasoning," divides all reasoning into 
the Demonstrative and the Contingent, meaning by the 
latter Inductive, which, as he suggests, might also be 
called Instinctive, as opposed to the Intuitive. Here, 
again, the errour of the common opinion with respect to 
Induction comes prominently forward, for that errour 
leads to the inconsistency of coupling together Instinct 
and Seasoning, which are perfectly distinct, and cannot 
amalgamate. 

17. Having exposed the errours and inconsistencies 
of others, I shall not conceal my own. In the " Prin- 
ciples of Psychology" I started the question, " If these 
inferences from experience be not reasoning, why do we 
talk of Inductive Seasoning at all P" 1 and this question I 
answered by endeavouring to show that " in simple cases 
1 Chap. x. P. 85. 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 129 

of inferences from experience, the natural tendency to 
associate phenomena once found in conjunction requires 
little guidance, while, in the more complicated, judg- 
ment and reasoning are necessary." At the same time, 
I pointed out the radical difference between Inductive 
Eeasoning and the other, and called the one set of infer- 
ences non-intuitive, the other intuitive. But the mis- 
take lay in supposing that non-intuitive inferences could 
ever be Eeasoning. The simple statement is a contra- 
diction; for Eeasoning is essentially intuitive. Some 
inferences from experience are made without deliberation, 
without hesitation, nay, without consciousness that they 
are inferences ; while others are not drawn till after long 
observation and examination, many difficulties suggested, 
and doubts arisen and dispelled : but in neither case is 
the conclusion drawn by Eeasoning. The difference is, 
that, in the former case we entertain no doubt of past in- 
variability, in the latter much doubt ; but remove this 
doubt, and the inference follows immediately in both 
cases. Was the Law of Gravitation discovered by 
Eeasoning, or with the aid of Eeasoning ? By no means. 
From a simple occurrence, the fall of an apple, as com- 
monly said, the idea first entered into the mind of New- 
ton, and this idea was afterwards confirmed by long ob- 
servation, that so it had always been and now was ; and 
this once settled, though no reasoning could prove, none 
was required to prove, that so it ever would be. 

18. That all Eeasoning, properly so called, is a priori, 
is proved from the very nature of Logic, pure Logic, 
which treats of Eeasoning, and which is an a priori 
science requiring no knowledge foreign to the mind itself, 



130 EEASON. 

only an intuition of consistency in thinking, no knowledge 
of the world without, its constitution or its course. It 
is only by an extension of the term beyond its proper 
limits that we talk of Inductive Logic, and, by the same 
extension, of Inductive Seasoning. But this similarity 
of name must not lead us to confound things, in spite 
of some resemblance, very different in reality, pure or 
Eatiocinative, and applied or Inductive Logic ; a priori 
or Deductive, and a posteriori or Inductive Eeasoning. 

19. It has long been supposed that Man is peculiarly 
distinguished from the lower animals by the faculty of 
Eeason — that this is the differentia whereby the species 
is separated from the other species of the Genus Animal; 
that man, in short, according to the old definition, is 
Animal rationale. But it would be hard to prove that 
all other animals are destitute of Eeason, and it seems 
improper to adopt as a characteristic what is at least 
doubtful. It is more correct to say that man is a Eea- 
soning Animal. As far as we know, Eeasoning is, in- 
deed, peculiar to man. We cannot believe that other 
animals are capable of reasoning ; and we must suppose 
that God is above it, that he discovers at once by simple 
Intuition, without reasoning, truth from errour. Eeason- 
ing, then, seems to be characteristic of such a being as 
man, " a little lower than the angels/' yet far above the 
brute creation ; immeasurably inferior to Deity, yet made 
in the image of God and "crowned with glory and 
honour/' The very uncertainty of reasoning is charac- 
teristic. The instincts of animals are invariable, un- 
erring ; the wisdom of God is so likewise. Man alone is 
reasoning and fallible. On every question, except ques- 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 131 4 

tions of quantity, different sides may be taken, and each 
may be supported by ingenious, if not powerful argu- 
ments, proving both the force of Keason and the uncer- 
tainty of Reasoning. How brightly does Reason shine 
in the reasonings of conflicting barristers, though on one 
side or the other they are fallacious ! 

20. The very perfection and triumph of Reasoning is 
Mathematics. In pure mathematics, by reasoning alone, 
without any knowledge of the universe and its laws, in 
complete ignorance of the facts of common life, and of 
everything around and without us, we arrive at innumer- 
able and irresistible conclusions ; and in mixed mathe- 
matics, on a foundation of facts known by experience, 
and assumed to be true universally, we build a vast 
superstructure of demonstrated inferences relative to the 
material world in which we live, and to the system of 
the universe. Here, then, we have reasoning in perfec- 
tion, and the results are truly imposing, sure, as well as 
useful. Is, then, Mathematics our best instructor, the 
safest nurse and tutor of our Reason? This by no 
means follows. As a specimen of reasoning it is perfect, 
but on that very account it is a treacherous guide. 
It accustoms us to think that questions are to be deter- 
mined by reasoning alone, and by reasoning in one line 
alone, for in mathematics there is but one ; whereas all 
other subjects can be viewed on many sides, and admit of 
many and diverging lines of argument. The tendency of 
Mathematics, then, is to narrow the mind, to improve 
the power of ratiocination no doubt, but to destroy com- 
prehensiveness, and so to unfit the Reason for the settle, 
ment of nice and complicated questions where much is 



132 SEASON. 

to be said on both sides. The exclusive cultivation of a 
science which admits of no doubt, no balancing of argu- 
ments, cannot be the best preparation for the affairs of 
common life, or even for other sciences abounding in dif- 
ficulties and subtle distinctions. What more opposed 
than Mathematics and Law ? In the mechanical arts, 
improvements in implements and machinery make less 
skill in the workman necessary ; and, in like manner, 
improvements in the language and method of reasoning 
diminish the necessary acuteness of the reasoner. Thus, 
Analytics is a much more powerful instrument, but a less 
intellectual exercise, than Geometry. 

21. Logic, pure Logic, that of the schools, for in- 
stance, so independent of information, so barren of results, 
was the finest whetstone of the reasoning powers, gave 
the keenest edge to the weapons of controversy ; though 
these weapons were often employed only in splitting straws. 
Never was the saying of Moliere more applicable — 

Raisonner est l'emploi de toute ma maison, 
Et le Raisonnement en bannit la raison ; 

&jeu d' esprit containing a profound truth, the possible 
divorce, or at least the temporary separation, of Keason 
and Eeasoning. 

22. Very different is Induction. There, as we have 
seen, the reasoning process is nil, but the results grand 
and fruitful, full of physical discoveries and material 
application. In the original inquirer, Induction must call 
into play some of the highest qualities of mind, rare 
powers of Keason, though not of reasoning ; but in the 
learner, Induction, while it informs, does not greatly im- 
prove the intellect. He acquires a knowledge of facts, 



OF COMPLEX INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. 133 

no doubt, facts of the highest interest and importance, 
but he learns these facts too easily, with too little effort 
of his own. His head may be crammed with knowledge, 
while the higher powers of mind are little exerted. He 
may be a walking Cyclopaedia, but incapable of solving 
any original problem, of settling any disputed question. 
Physical Science, therefore, which rests upon Induction, 
cannot be the best means of education. 

23. Upon the whole, it appears that the sciences most 
fertile in results, as Analytical Mathematics and the In- 
ductive Sciences, afford the least training to the intellect, 
to the reasoning powers especially; while those more 
barren of fruit, as Geometry and Logic, give the best 
intellectual exercise. Metaphysics or Psychology is pro- 
bably the best training of all, for it requires the subtlety 
of logic, combined with a greater compass of thought. 



CHAPTEE IV. 



OF THE REASON OF ANIMALS. 



1. That animals possess Instinct is universally allowed ; 
that they are endowed with Keason is generally denied. 
In order to answer the question whether animals possess 
Keason, we must first agree as to the meaning of the 
term Beason, and afterwards we may determine whether 
the lower animals be endowed with it or not. 

2. In chapter first, Par. 7 of this Part II., we arrived 
at the conclusion that " Comprehension of Relation, and 
Intuition as to the agreement or disagreement, whether 
of Notion with Notion, of Thing with Thing, or of 
Relation with Relation/' was the whole of Reason ; that 
Comprehension alone might be called Reason in embryo; 
and when united to Intuition, the perfect plant. 

3. That animals soon come to know the common con- 
sequences of things around them, that they avoid fire and 
other dangers, there is no doubt ; and, therefore, they 
must draw inferences from experience, general inferences 
for their conduct in particular cases. All this, however, 
as we have seen in the instance of man, they can do 
merely by Instinct, the instinctive tendency to associate 
phenomena once conjoined, a tendency afterwards con- 
firmed by Custom. So, the various accomplishments and 
tricks acquired by dogs and other animals, particularly 



OF THE REASON OF ANIMALS. 135 

pointer and shepherd dogs, may be traced to custom 
alone. In all this there is no place, no occasion for 
Reason. 

4. The essence of Reason is Intuition, or the power of 
distinguishing one thing from another. But Reason is 
not required for every distinction, for distinguishing, for 
instance, between our Perceptions, for even the mad and 
the fatuous have that power. The madman runs into 
danger on purpose to destroy himself, not because he is 
ignorant of the danger, and the feeblest intellect will not 
confound a man with a horse. So, no Reason is required 
in animals to enable them to distinguish one object of 
perception from another. 

5. Animals, undoubtedly, have Memory, but Memory 
is independent of Reason, and they may have Imagina- 
tion, as in their dreams, but this alone is not a function 
of Reason. It is an intellectual, but not a rational 
faculty. Animals must also generalize to a certain ex- 
tent, or they could learn nothing from experience ; but 
this degree of generalization, confined to objects of per- 
ception, requires no effort of mind, no exercise of reason. 
It is, like Perception itself, unavoidable. If, then, all 
these powers, undoubtedy possessed by animals, may exist 
without Reason, and are sufficient for them, why confer 
upon them this noble faculty ? 

6. Can it be shewn that animals are capable of com- 
prehending any proposition the least abstract? Can 
they even conceive any abstract idea, any abstract idea 
of number, for instance? General ideas of Objects of 
Perception sufficient to distinguish a man from a horse, 
a dog from a cat, w r e allow that they possess; but of 



136 REASON. 

abstract ideas they seem to have none ; much less can 
they comprehend the relations of those ideas, or any pro- 
position formed concerning them. They can certainly 
comprehend that one object of present perception is 
larger than another, so that one fence, for instance, can 
be leapt with ease, another not, that a smaller animal 
may be attacked with impunity, another with risk ; but 
their comprehension seems limited to what is imme- 
diately in presence, and extends not to the distant or the 
abstract. And if the power of comprehension, which we 
have called Reason in embryo , be in them so low, how 
can we look for Keason in its higher development ? 

7. At the same time, the above examples suffice to shew 
& faint glimmering of Reason, enough for the condition 
of animals ; for the horse, when he takes one fence and 
declines another beyond his power, evinces a slight de- 
gree of judgment, as also the dog when he pounces upon 
a rat but avoids a badger. This, then, seems • to be the 
most which we can accord to animals, Comprehension of 
the difference between one object of Perception and an- 
other, and a judgment founded thereon which regulates 
their conduct. Should we see a small dog attack a large 
one, we would naturally say, What a fool he is, shewing 
that we believe the species to be capable of some reason ; 
for where there is no reason there can be no folly. 

THE END. 



H. & J. Pillars, Printers, Edinburgh. 



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